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ABSTRACT 
 
During the past two decades, the fraction of the world’s initial public offerings (IPOs) accounted for by 
U.S. firms has fallen sharply. This decrease is attributed to higher IPO activity outside the U.S. and lower 
IPO activity in the U.S. We show that financial globalization has played a major role in the growth of 
IPOs outside the U.S. Historically, a country’s IPO activity was strongly related to the quality of its 
institutions and better institutions helped explain the higher IPO activity in the U.S. compared to other 
countries. However, greater financial globalization has been associated with a reduction in the importance 
of institutions as determinants of a country’s IPO activity. A large part of the increase in IPO activity 
outside the U.S. occurred through global IPOs, IPOs in which some of the proceeds are raised outside the 
firm’s home country. Financial globalization has enabled firms from countries with poorer institutions to 
make use of global IPOs and they have done so more than firms from other countries. The evidence is 
consistent with the view that access to global markets and, more generally, financial globalization helps 
firms overcome the obstacles of poor institutions. 
 
 1 
It is widely believed that a vibrant market for initial public offerings (IPOs) is an asset of the U.S. 
Black and Gilson (1998), and many others, argue that this market plays a critical role in facilitating 
entrepreneurship and venture capital in the U.S. economy. This view permeates corporate finance 
textbooks. For example, Megginson and Smart (2009) write: “Given its role in providing capital market 
access for entrepreneurial growth companies, the U.S. initial public offering market is widely considered 
a vital economic and financial asset.” The law and finance literature shows that IPO activity depends on 
country-level laws and governance institutions. For instance, it finds that IPO activity is higher in 
common law countries compared to countries with other legal origins. From this perspective, IPO activity 
has been vibrant in the U.S., at least in part, because of its strong laws and governance institutions. 
However, financial globalization makes it possible for firms to take advantage of the institutions of other 
countries, so that a firm’s home country institutions could become less important in its decision-making 
(see, e.g, Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2007; and Stulz, 2009). 
In this paper, we show that there has been a striking evolution over time in IPO activity across 
countries and that financial globalization helps explain this evolution. To conduct our analysis, we build a 
comprehensive sample of 29,341 IPOs from 89 countries constituting almost $2.6 trillion (constant 2007 
U.S. dollars) of capital raised over 1990 to 2007. A striking fact that emerges from this dataset is that the 
worldwide share of IPO activity by U.S. firms has fallen sharply over this period. In the 1990s, the yearly 
average of the number of U.S. IPOs comprised 27% of all IPOs worldwide, while in the 2000s the U.S. 
share of all IPOs fell to 12%. Similar results hold for proceeds. 
A decrease in the U.S. share of world IPOs can arise because the economic importance of the U.S. 
decreased, but this is not the case. In the 1990s, the U.S. accounted for 27% of world Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Since 2000, the U.S. share of worldwide GDP has averaged 30%. Therefore, the U.S. 
share of IPO activity is lower because the rate at which firms went public in the U.S. fell and / or because 
the rate at which non-U.S. firms went public increased. We show that an important part of the decrease in 
the U.S. share is due to an increase in IPO activity by non-U.S. firms. 2 
To a large extent, the growth in IPOs outside the U.S. is fueled by the emergence of global IPOs, 
IPOs in which some or all of the shares are sold outside the home country of the firm going public. In 
2007, proceeds raised globally accounted for 61% of total worldwide IPO proceeds, which is double the 
fraction raised in 1990. Almost all the proceeds raised globally were raised by non-U.S. firms going 
public. This growth in importance of global IPOs could not have taken place without the increased 
integration of financial markets around the world. We argue, and provide supporting evidence, that 
financial globalization has far-reaching implications for the rate at which firms go public across countries 
and helps explain the decrease in the relative importance of U.S. IPOs compared to non-U.S. IPOs. 
The law and finance literature (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997 and 1998, 
and Shleifer and Wolfenson, 2002, hereafter LLSV and SW) shows that differences in countries’ laws, 
governance, disclosure, and enforcement standards (hereafter “institutions”) that protect minority 
shareholders can explain variation in IPO activity across countries. It predicts that IPO activity in 
countries other than the U.S. should increase relative to that in the U.S. if their institutions improve 
relative to those of the U.S. or if a country’s institutions become less important determinants of IPO 
activity. While institutions typically change slowly, an increase in financial globalization can affect the 
importance of home country institutions quickly. We focus on the latter effect. 
SW provide the archetypal model of how a country’s laws and governance affect the benefits and 
costs of going public for the owners of firms and hence affect the likelihood that a firm will go public in a 
given country. In their model, the problem for public firms is that the controlling shareholder can extract 
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Since minority shareholders buy shares at the 
IPO at fair value, any expected private benefits consumption reduces IPO proceeds. In equilibrium, the 
amount of private benefits consumption and the associated deadweight costs are inversely related to the 
quality of institutions. Private benefits are lower in countries with good laws and good governance so that 
in these countries the equity of firms is worth more and more firms gain from going public. 
We test this prediction using several different country-level proxies for institutions based on laws, 
governance, disclosure, and enforcement standards. Countries with better institutions have more domestic 3 
IPO activity, measured as either the annual number of domestic IPOs scaled by the lagged number of 
domestic listed firms or as the annual proceeds raised in domestic IPOs scaled by lagged GDP. Firms can 
supplement weaker institutions in their home country through additional  commitments to firm-level 
governance. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (hereafter DKS, 2007) show that a firm’s investment in 
mechanisms to improve corporate governance depends critically on the level of its home country’s 
economic development, financial development, and openness. When economic and financial development 
are high, investment in governance is cheaper and more effective so that a country’s institutions are less 
important. In our regressions, we account for a country’s per capita GDP, stock market capitalization to 
GDP ratio, and stock market turnover. Our results hold after controlling for these development measures, 
along with other determinants of IPO activity. 
The free flow of capital globally allows firms to raise funds publicly outside their country of 
domicile. By all measures, finance became much more global when one compares the 2000s before the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009 to the 1980s. In the 1980s, many countries with viable stock markets 
were actually closed to capital flows (see Karolyi and Stulz, 2003). Very few of these countries were still 
closed or had substantial obstacles to capital flows by the year 2000. SW (2002), DKS (2007), and Stulz 
(2009) address the impact of financial globalization on IPO activity. They suggest that home country 
institutions may have opposite effects on domestic compared to global IPOs. That is, global IPOs can be 
used to overcome the adverse effects of poor home country institutions. 
In the models of DKS (2007) and Stulz (2009), financial market globalization allows firms to borrow 
the institutions of foreign countries. For example, global IPOs often involve a foreign listing, so that a 
firm using a global IPO becomes subject to laws and regulations as well as monitoring outside its country. 
The literature on foreign listings shows that this benefit is important when firms list in the U.S. (see 
Karolyi, 2012). However, global IPOs take advantage of foreign institutions and involve foreign 
monitoring even when they are not associated with a foreign listing. For example, global IPOs typically 
engage reputable foreign underwriters and investment bankers. 4 
Firms from countries with weaker institutions should benefit more from borrowing stronger 
institutions of foreign countries. Therefore, we expect that such firms are more likely to go public with a 
global IPO and to raise more proceeds in foreign markets. Measuring the relative importance of global 
IPO activity by firms in a given country as either the difference between the number of global IPOs and 
domestic IPOs normalized by the number of listed firms or the difference between global IPO proceeds 
and domestic IPO proceeds normalized by lagged GDP, we find strong support for the prediction that 
countries with weaker institutions have more global IPO activity. These findings are robust to controlling 
for other important determinants of IPO activity. 
The importance of home country institutions for the level of IPO activity can change over time with 
improved technology and with growing financial globalization. Home country institutions should be less 
important in a more global world because firms can benefit from institutions and resources from other 
countries in their governance, even if they do not go public through a global IPO (Stulz, 1999). For 
instance, because of greater globalization, firms that go public in their own country can now use foreign 
auditors, law firms, and investment banks. The IPO literature emphasizes the importance of certification 
of the issuing firm (Ritter and Welch, 2002) and the use of foreign advisers and monitors can help certify 
the quality of the issuing firm in a more credible way than local advisers and monitors. Financial 
globalization also makes it easier for overseas investors to invest in IPOs from a given country. When an 
IPO is global, it is specifically structured so that it can be more easily accessed by overseas investors. 
However, as barriers to international investment become less important, foreign investors also have easier 
access to domestic IPOs. Because foreign investors are typically institutional investors, they can be more 
active monitors of firms. In particular, they can push for better firm-level governance, as shown in 
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011), and management may have to be more shareholder-friendly 
to prevent such investors from walking away. 
The literature predicts that, with more capital market openness and globalization, the role of home 
country institutions for domestic IPO activity will diminish in importance. Specifically, DKS (2007) 
predict that the role of home country institutions for IPO activity, conditional on the level of financial and 5 
economic development, is lower when global markets are more accessible. To test this prediction, we 
construct a measure of financial globalization from the updated and extended dataset compiled by Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (LMF, 2007). Each year, we sum the U.S. dollar-denominated value of external assets 
and liabilities across countries and divide the sum by world GDP (also in U.S. dollars). Strikingly, the 
domestic IPO rate is strongly negatively related to financial globalization, while the relative importance 
of global IPOs increases with financial globalization. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the impact of national institutions on the domestic IPO rate falls 
strongly as financial globalization increases. For instance, using the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (hereafter DLLS, 2008) as a measure of the quality of 
institutions, we find that a one standard deviation higher index score is associated with a 1.44% higher 
domestic IPO rate when the financial globalization measure is lower (such as during the 1990s when the 
ratio of external assets and liabilities to world GDP averaged 139%). However, a similar one standard-
deviation higher index score is associated with only a 0.92% higher domestic IPO rate when the financial 
globalization measure is higher (such as during the 2000s when the ratio of external assets and liabilities 
to world GDP exceeded 252%). Home country institutions also become a less important factor for the 
decision to pursue a global IPO relative to a domestic IPO as a result  of the increase in financial 
globalization. This finding  implies that global IPOs  have  become more valuable even for firms in 
countries with better institutions and indicates that global IPOs have advantages that go beyond those 
suggested by the law and finance literature, namely, access to global market opportunities. 
The literature on time-series variation in IPO activity focuses on changes in growth opportunities and 
market conditions. Ritter’s (2003) survey points out that swings in the volume of IPOs are of considerable 
interest and that the volume seems to be “hypersensitive to changes in market conditions” (p. 293). Lowry 
(2003) addresses why IPO volume fluctuates so much and concludes that changes in aggregate capital 
demands of private firms and in investor optimism are the primary determinants. Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales (1998) find that for a sample of Italian IPOs the predominant reason firms go public is to 
rebalance their capital structure and to exploit mispricing, rather than to raise capital for financing 6 
investments. Loughran and Ritter (1995) also find support for the market-timing explanation for U.S. 
IPOs, while Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) find similar results internationally. To capture 
changing market conditions, we control for the country-level Tobin’s q ratio as well as for country-level 
GDP growth. With financial globalization, we expect domestic market conditions to be less critical for the 
success of an IPO as firms can access foreign markets with different conditions and attract foreign 
investors whose demand for the stock may be less affected by domestic conditions. To proxy for market 
conditions for global IPOs, we construct a world-level Tobin’s q ratio, which is a weighted average of 
world industry median q ratios. We find that the relative importance of global IPOs is strongly positively 
related to this world-level Tobin’s q, so that market conditions outside the country of a firm going public 
play an important role in whether a firm uses the global IPO mechanism or not. 
Our tests and findings are new, but our effort is related to and adds to several recent papers. First, 
LLSV (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (hereafter LLS, 2006), and DLLS (2008) show 
that legal protections for minority investors through rules and enforcement, as well as securities laws 
mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement, are associated with more IPO activity (on 
average, between 1996 and 2000). We use their legal protection and securities law measures, but we also 
capture important dynamics of IPO activity over time in conjunction with changing investment 
opportunities and financial globalization. Further, we distinguish between domestic and global IPOs. Kim 
and Weisbach (2008) use a broad sample of 17,226 IPOs from 38 countries to examine firms’ motives for 
going public. They find that IPO proceeds are predominantly used to finance investments and that there 
are few differences in the uses of IPO proceeds between firms in common law and civil law countries. 
Caglio, Hanley, and Marietta-Westberg (2011) find that global IPOs account for a significant fraction of 
total IPO proceeds. They show that characteristics of firms that choose a global IPO are different from 
those that choose a domestic IPO and that global IPOs originate from countries with lower bond and stock 
market development and lower disclosure standards. Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2012) examine  possible 
reasons for the decrease in the number of IPOs in the U.S. and conclude that it has become more efficient 
for small firms to be acquired than to grow on their own with funds obtained from public offerings. 7 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we explain the construction of our IPO sample and 
describe its characteristics. In Section II, we document the rise of IPO activity abroad and the decline in 
the U.S. In Section III, we examine the role of institutions in IPO activity across the world. The impact of 
globalization on IPO activity is studied in Section IV. In Section V, we use our regression models to show 
that financial globalization has led to an increase in overseas IPO activity relative to U.S. IPO activity. 
We discuss the robustness of our results in Section VI. We conclude in Section VII. 
 
I. The IPO sample and country-level data. 
A.  IPO sample. 
We obtain IPO data from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Global New Issues Database. For 
each IPO, this database provides information on the issuer, the issue date, total proceeds, the number and 
type of shares offered, the offer price, whether the issue is domestic only or contains an international 
tranche, and whether or not a tranche is offered to public or private investors. We begin by downloading 
all transactions in SDC where the “original IPO” flag is set to “yes.” Because SDC has limited coverage 
for non-U.S. IPOs prior to 1990, our sample begins in January 1990. The sample ends in December 2007. 
The initial count is 38,722 observations. We eliminate transactions with a single domestic tranche that 
SDC flags as a private placement (55 observations). There are 526 cases in which there is more than one 
transaction reported in SDC for the same firm within a narrow window of time. Many of these are global 
IPOs where the domestic and international tranches have different issue dates, usually within a few days 
of each other. We drop 236 observations with a gap of 30 days or more between issue dates. Following 
Kim and Weisbach (2008), we remove 48 transactions that do not contain any information on proceeds 
raised. The data for some IPOs is recorded over multiple lines in SDC, even if there is only one tranche in 
the offering. We consolidate these issues into one line of record and drop 1,358 observations. Some 
foreign IPOs (those with an international tranche but no domestic tranche) and all global IPOs (those with 
both domestic and international tranches) are also recorded over multiple lines in SDC. We consolidate 
that information into one line and drop the 3,627 duplicate records. We also drop 93 transactions that do 8 
not have Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, leaving us with 33,305 observations, each of 
which represents a unique IPO. 
To construct our final sample, we exclude an additional 3,964 IPOs. We drop 3,856 IPOs by REITs 
and investment funds (distributed across SIC codes 6722, 6722, 6726, 6798, and 6799), 19 transactions 
that SDC classified as IPOs but were actually follow-on offerings, 44 IPOs where the country of origin 
has no data (more details below, but they include tax havens like the British Virgin Islands, Guernsey, or 
the Cayman Islands), and 45 IPOs from 16 countries for which there were no domestic IPOs (only global 
IPOs) during the 18-year sample period.
1  The final sample contains 29,341 IPOs from 89 different 
countries of which 24,155 are purely domestic and 5,186 are foreign only and global offers. 
While we hope that our screening process eliminated mistakes in the SDC database, it cannot add 
IPOs that were missed by SDC. An alternative source for IPO data is Dealogic. We compare our data to 
an alternative sample of IPOs collected by Professor Jay Ritter, which is mostly from Dealogic, and later 
use this alternative sample (hereafter, the “Ritter” sample) in robustness checks.
2 This sample focuses on 
the total number of IPOs and does not distinguish between domestic and global IPOs. The Ritter sample 
covers 46 countries and includes 23,896 IPOs for our sample period. Our sample includes 89 countries 
and 29,341 IPOs. When we restrict our sample to the 46 countries that overlap with those in the Ritter 
sample, we have 27,877 IPOs, which exceeds the Ritter sample count by 3,981 IPOs. The annual counts 
are usually quite close though the Ritter sample has fewer IPOs than the SDC sample in all years but 
three. For most country-years, the differences between the two samples are small and vary in sign, but 
there are some country-years for which the differences are large. We have a much larger number of IPOs 
for Canada and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. than in the Ritter sample in most years. We also have more 
Chinese IPOs in recent years. However, the Ritter sample has a much higher number of IPOs for Turkey 
in the 1990s than we do. It also has more IPOs for the U.K. in the early 1990s. 
                                                 
1 Countries with no domestic IPOs include: Angola, Barbados, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Faroe Islands, 
Georgia, Ghana, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macau, Malta, Netherlands Antilles, Slovenia, Ukraine, and 
Uruguay. These countries do not have data on country market conditions and institutions and would not be included 
in the regressions even if we did not explicitly drop them. 
2 We thank Professor Ritter for making this sample of IPO counts available to us. 9 
A second alternative data source is Bloomberg,  which is used in  Caglio, Hanley, and Marietta-
Westberg (2011). Their sample includes 17,808 IPOs from 90 countries over the period 1995 to 2007.
3 
The patterns in year-to-year changes are similar to those in SDC, although the counts in SDC are 
substantially higher until 2000, at which time they become quite close to the Bloomberg counts through 
2007. We also conduct a more systematic comparison with the Bloomberg data and with data from the 
home-market exchanges for four randomly chosen countries (Brazil, Canada, Germany, and Malaysia) 
from the early 1980s through 2007. In each case, we obtain information on domestic and global IPOs for 
counts since these exchanges do not report proceeds. For Germany from 1997 to the present, the SDC 
counts are almost identical to those reported by the  Deutsche  Börse  on their website. Those for 
Bloomberg are higher (about 50% discrepancy, on average); that source reports more than double the 
count in 2005-2006 relative to the Deutsche Börse and SDC.
4 For Malaysia, the IPO counts in Bloomberg 
are very similar to those from the Bursa Malaysia website and SDC  (less than 5% discrepancy,  on 
average). Finally, for Canada, the Bloomberg counts are on average 40% lower than for SDC.
5 
B.  Country-level and world-level data. 
In our regressions, the dependent variable is a measure of the rate of IPO activity and the independent 
variables are country-level variables as well as some world-level variables. For each country and each 
year, we compute the number of IPOs (“IPO counts”) as well as the total proceeds raised in IPOs (“IPO 
proceeds”). To compute IPO counts and proceeds, we distinguish between domestic IPOs and global 
IPOs (foreign IPOs are included with global IPOs). To benchmark IPO activity across countries that differ 
in size, we scale the IPO counts by the lagged number of publicly-listed domestic companies in the 
                                                 
3 Caglio, Hanley, and Marietta-Westberg (2011) separate IPOs into domestic, foreign, and global IPOs. However, 
they define global IPOs differently than we do. In their case, global IPOs must list on an exchange outside of their 
home country to be counted as such. If the IPO includes a foreign tranche and if the firm’s shares are not listed on an 
overseas exchange, they count it as a domestic IPO. 94% of the IPOs in their sample are classified as domestic. 
4  Each of the 81  German  IPOs listed in Bloomberg in 2005 were manually checked and several firms (e.g., 
Bertelsmann, IC Immobilien, Marenave Schiffahrts, and Qsil) were not on the Deutsche Börse website. These firms 
had announced plans to do an IPO, but subsequently announced that they would defer the IPO due to restructuring 
or other reasons. Bloomberg appears to rely on corporate news releases and prospectuses. 
5 We also investigated an additional possible data source in the data provided by the World Federation of Exchanges 
(WFE). WFE data reports changes in listing counts, which unfortunately include firms that change the exchange on 
which they list within a given country, as well as investment trusts and other non-corporate listings. Consequently, 
we concluded that this data source is not appropriate for our investigation.  10 
country of domicile and the IPO proceeds by lagged home country GDP. These data are obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) Database. Listed domestic companies include 
domestically incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock exchanges at the end of the year and do 
not include investment companies, mutual funds, REITs or other collective investment vehicles. GDP is 
reported in U.S. dollars converted from domestic currencies using the end-of-year official exchange rate 
for that country. 
An important set of data in our work are country-specific institutional variables related to the quality 
of investor legal protections  and  securities laws related to disclosure requirements and enforcement 
standards. There are a large number of institutional variables that could be used. In our main tests, we 
focus on a set of representative variables and discuss additional results in the robustness section. 
From LLSV (1998), it is well  known that common law  countries have better institutions. We, 
therefore, use the common law dummy introduced by LLSV (1998) and extended in DLLS (2008). It 
equals one if the origin of commercial law in a country is English common law, and zero otherwise 
(“Common law”). It is available for all countries in our sample and has the advantage that it is exogenous 
to the outcomes we observe. A popular index of legal protections for minority investors is the anti-
director rights index of LLSV (1998) and updated and revised by DLLS (2008). This index has been 
criticized for a variety of reasons (see, for example, Coffee (2001) and Spamann (2010)) and DLLS argue 
that their index of self-dealing is clearer conceptually and pertains more directly to the pervasive problem 
of corporate self-dealing, or “tunneling.” Therefore, we use their index of anti-self-dealing (“Anti-self-
dealing”) to address the ways in which the law deals with corporate self-dealing. It is assembled by means 
of a 2003 survey of Lex Mundi law firms in 72 countries and includes components related to ex ante 
private control of self-dealing, such as disclosures that counterparties in a transaction must make before 
approval is granted by disinterested shareholders as well as similar ex post disclosures (such as access to 
evidence) for independent reviews of transactions after completion toward possible rescission or follow-
on suits. 11 
DLLS (2008) also conclude that the measures of shareholder protection from securities laws 
constructed in LLS (2006) work well in terms of predicting stock market outcomes and are particularly 
appropriate for studies of protections for investors buying securities. LLS (2006) devise measures based 
on a survey of attorneys in 49 countries in 2000. We use two measures from that study. We use a 
disclosure requirements index (“Disclosure”)  that includes components related to requirements for 
prospectuses, information on compensation of directors and key officers, the issuer’s ownership structure, 
related-party transactions with directors, officers or large block-holders, and the presence of contracts 
outside the ordinary course of business. We also use a liability standard index (“Liability standards”) that 
comprises measures of four liability standards in cases against issuers and directors, distributors, and 
accountants. Finally, we include a measure of the rule of law (“Rule of law”) from the World Bank’s 
World Governance Indicators database (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010). In contrast to the 
LLSV and DLLS variables, this variable is measured every year. It captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by rules related to contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police and the courts as well as likelihood of crime and violence. It is based on a survey of public and 
private sector experts and is available for over 200 countries since 1996, including annually from 2002. 
For our analysis, we require a measure of the extent of financial globalization. The literature uses a 
number of measures for de jure openness. While these measures exhibit cross-sectional variation, they 
generally have only limited time-series variation during our sample period. Moreover, they do not capture 
the extent to which financial globalization is actually taking place (de facto openness), which is central to 
our analysis. If residents from one country can invest freely in another country, they may or may not do 
so. If they do not do so, it is not clear why financial globalization should lead to more global IPOs since 
there would be no appetite for IPOs by foreign companies. A proper measure for our purpose should then 
focus on the extent of gross external claims, including assets and liabilities.
6 Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and 
Wei (2009) discuss the pros and cons of various measures and conclude that the most appropriate measure 
                                                 
6 A measure of net cross-country claims is not appropriate since a country with zero net claims on foreign residents 
could be a country with large foreign equity asset holdings financed with foreign debt liabilities. See Borio and 
Disiyata (2011) for a discussion of the limitations from using measures of external net claims. 12 
of financial globalization is the one constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). We use data from 
their updated and extended dataset that includes annual measures of the sum of a country’s external assets 
and liabilities. 
Each year, we sum across each country’s external assets and liabilities and divide by world GDP to 
compute an annual measure of world financial globalization (“World financial globalization”). We do not 
use a country-level measure for two reasons. First, a country-level measure, even if it is lagged, will likely 
be higher for countries that recently had global IPOs, thus creating a potential mechanical relation with 
global IPO activity. In contrast, there is little risk of such a mechanical relation with the world measure. 
Second, the world measure captures the extent to which countries’ capital markets are interconnected, 
which makes possible global IPO activity from any country. This measure equals 116% of world GDP in 
1990. It increases slowly until 1997 when it equals 149%. From 1997 to 2000 it increases sharply to 
204%, after which it is relatively stable for a few years. It then increases sharply and reaches 327% of 
GDP in 2007, the last year of the sample period. 
In our regressions, we also include measures of development. To measure the level of economic 
development in a country, we use the log of GDP per capita (“Log(GDP per capita)”). This variable is 
obtained from the WDI Database. For measures of financial market development, we use the 2008 update 
of the Financial Development and Structure  database, originally used in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,  and 
Levine (2000). We collect data for the stock market turnover ratio (“Market turnover,” the ratio of the 
value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization) and stock market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP (“Market cap/GDP,” the ratio of the market capitalization of listed shares to GDP). 
To control for local market conditions as a factor in the going-public decision, we include a measure 
of economic growth (“GDP growth”) and a country-level measure of Tobin’s q. At the firm level, q is 
computed annually from data obtained from Thomson Reuter’s Worldscope database and is defined as the 
ratio of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of total 
assets. All variables are in local currency. Using the Fama-French 17 industry classification scheme, we 
compute the median q and relative market value for each industry annually. The country-level measure of 13 
q  (“Country  q”)  is the market value-weighted average of the median industry q. This measure is 
constructed analogously to the local growth opportunities (“LGO”) measure based on price-to-earnings 
ratios used in Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (hereafter BHLS, 2007).  In the global IPO 
regressions, we also include a world-level measure of q (“World q”). For all firms in an industry around 
the world, we compute the median q each year. To compute the world q, each  world industry  q is 
weighted by the industry’s relative market value (in current U.S. Dollars). This measure is the parallel to 
the BHLS’s global growth opportunities (“GGO”) measure. 
Summary statistics, including means, standard deviations, and correlations among these measures are 
provided in Appendix A. 
 
II. The rise of IPOs abroad and the decline in the U.S. share of worldwide IPOs. 
Table 1, Panel a shows the total number of IPOs and breaks it down by domestic IPOs and global 
IPOs by year. Annual IPO counts increase from less than 1,000 in the early 1990s to a peak of 3,099 in 
1996. They decrease after 1996 before reaching another peak of 2,117 in 2000. The counts fall below 
1,000 for three years after 2000 before increasing again steadily to reach 1,850 in 2007. Panel a also 
shows that the rise and fall in annual counts until 2003 occurs for both domestic and global IPOs. The 
surge in overall counts after 2003 is much more dramatic for global offers. For domestic IPOs, 2007 does 
not exceed the earlier peaks, while the count for global IPOs in 2007 is higher than in any other year in 
the sample period. Generally, there is more year-to-year variation in global IPOs. From the peak in 2000 
to the trough in 2003, global IPOs fall by 84%; in contrast, domestic IPOs fall by only 44%. 
The results for IPO proceeds are presented in Table 1, Panel b. We obtain proceeds in U.S. dollars 
from SDC and convert them into constant 2007 values using U.S. inflation rates from the World Bank’s 
WDI database. Panel b shows that total annual IPO proceeds rise during the 1990s to reach a peak of $242 
billion in 2000. Annual proceeds decline to $59 billion by 2003 and then rise again, reaching a peak of 
$279 billion in 2007. Domestic IPO proceeds are less volatile over the period, so that changes in annual 
proceeds from global IPOs are the more important factor in the steady rise of total IPO proceeds during 14 
the 1990s and especially in the rapid expansion after 2003, reaching $189 billion in 2007. Indeed, total 
proceeds raised in global IPOs account for almost 68% of all IPO proceeds in 2007. Global IPOs include 
a domestic tranche and international tranches. The last column of Panel b shows proceeds obtained in the 
international tranches of global IPOs. As a percentage of total proceeds raised in global IPOs, proceeds 
raised in international tranches have increased over the 2000s, reaching a peak of 90% in 2007. 
There are some important differences in the evolution of counts and proceeds in both domestic and 
global IPOs. In the 1990s, there is a dramatic increase in counts that is driven by an increase in domestic 
IPOs. The number  of domestic IPOs peaks in 1996 and does not come close to  that peak again in 
subsequent years. In fact, after 2000, the count never exceeds even half the peak reached in 1996. In 
contrast, however, domestic IPO proceeds are higher in the mid-1990s, but the proceeds raised in 2006 
dwarf those of earlier years. There is a steady increase in the number of global IPOs until 2000. The count 
then drops, but increases again after 2003 and peaks in 2007. Proceeds that are raised in global IPOs 
increase throughout the 1990s to reach a peak in 2000. They collapse to a trough in 2003, and then 
increase sharply to reach the peak of 2000 again in 2007, although the percentage of global IPO proceeds 
that are raised in international tranches is much higher in 2007 compared to 2000. 
Table 2, Panel a shows the cross-country pattern in annual IPO counts. Developed countries with the 
largest economies and capital markets in the world, such as the U.S. (6,126 IPOs), Japan (2,234), Canada 
(2,224), U.K. (1,649), Australia (1,557), and Hong Kong (822), have the highest overall counts, but a 
number of emerging countries such as India (4,867), China (1,764), Taiwan (822), and South Korea 
(775), have high counts as well. Fifteen countries are in the top 25 for both counts and proceeds. Panel b 
shows that the U.S. total of $648 billion constitutes almost 25% of the total worldwide IPO proceeds of 
$2.54 trillion. The other major markets include China ($255 billion, 10%), Japan ($204 billion, 9%), U.K. 
($196 billion, 8%), and are followed by France (5%), Germany (4%), Canada (3%), and Italy (3%). 
However, some countries that are in the top 25 for counts are not in the top 25 for proceeds (Greece, 
Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Poland), whereas some countries are in the top 25 for proceeds but not for 
counts (Bermuda, Mexico, Russia, Spain, and Switzerland). 15 
The country-by-country averages hide dramatic changes in the frequency of IPOs across countries. In 
addition to showing the counts for all IPOs across the world, Figure 1 shows the counts for the U.S., the 
U.K., and China (Panel a). The U.S. dominates the U.K. and China in counts until 2001 when the counts 
are roughly the same and stay that way until the end of the sample period. The U.S. counts peaked in 
1996, but the number of U.S. IPOs has been small compared to that peak since 2001. If at one point in 
time the U.S. was the “land of the IPO,” it is no longer so in the 2000s if one focuses on IPO counts. One 
way to see this is that the U.S. share of total IPO counts exceeds 20% in each of the first ten years of the 
sample except for 1994 when it is 19%. It never exceeds 13% after 2001. In the 1990s, the U.S. share of 
total IPO counts towers over the share of the U.K. and China, as each country’s share is below 10% each 
year in the 1990s. Though the shares  of these countries increase in the 2000s, the U.S. share stops 
towering over theirs mostly because the U.S. share itself is so much lower in the 2000s. Japan, Australia, 
Taiwan, and Korea all experienced substantial increases in counts as well (not shown on the figure). 
There was also a dramatic shift in the composition of IPO proceeds over the past two decades. The 
U.S. share of total IPO proceeds declined from about 30% in the 1990s to only 21% in the 2000s (through 
2007, at least). Japan and the U.K. also experienced a decline from 10% to 6% and from 9% to 6%, 
respectively. Among the other large markets, no major shift in market share arises (e.g., Canada, France, 
Italy, and Germany), except for China which more than doubles from a 6% to a 14% share ($182 billion 
out of the $1.29 trillion). In 2006 and 2007, China’s total IPO proceeds actually exceed those of the U.S. 
(see Panel b). Because of the dramatic changes in China’s IPO market, we perform supplementary tests 
throughout our study for a sample that excludes Chinese IPOs, which we discuss later. 
The decreased importance of U.S. IPOs occurs at different times for counts versus proceeds. The 
share of U.S. counts in world IPO counts decreases sharply until 1994. After that year, it increases until 
1999 and then collapses starting in 2000. It stays steadily low in the 2000s. In contrast, U.S. IPO proceeds 
mostly parallel the world’s proceeds until 2003, at which point the world IPO proceeds take off and the 
U.S. IPO proceeds do not. 16 
One useful way to compare patterns in counts and proceeds for the U.S. and the world is to 
benchmark them relative to the number of listed firms and GDP, respectively. Figure 2 summarizes this 
evidence. It reports the ratio of IPO counts to the number of domestic listed firms (Panel a) and the ratio 
of IPO proceeds to GDP (Panel b) for both the U.S. and for the rest of the world (excluding the U.S.). It 
also shows the difference between the U.S. and the rest of the world. The U.S. tends to have higher values 
than the world, but not consistently, until 1999. After 2003, the ratios for the world increase while the 
ratios for the U.S. stagnate. If the importance of IPOs in the U.S. were measured relative to the economic 
importance of the U.S. and if this ratio were benchmarked against the equivalent one for the world, we 
might expect these ratios to stay constant over time. Instead, the ratios fall over time, especially for 
proceeds. That is, the importance of IPOs in the U.S. relative to the world has not kept up with the overall 
economic importance of the U.S. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the U.S. share of IPO counts and proceeds relative to that of the 
world over time. The statistics are reported separately for domestic IPOs, global IPOs, and all IPOs. There 
is a steady decline in the U.S. share of IPO counts (Panel a) regardless of the type of IPO. For proceeds 
(Panel b), the decline in the U.S. share is primarily due to a decline in its share of global IPO proceeds 
from around 10% in the 1990s to a negligible fraction after 2001.  
The evidence in this section shows that IPOs in the rest of the world became much more important 
and that the U.S. share of world IPOs fell. One possible explanation is that country affiliations simply 
became less important because firms wanting to pursue IPOs found ways to avoid being hindered by 
national institutional obstacles. For instance, firms can use global markets to go public and avoid the 
constraints of their home country. A second possibility is that there is a “catching-up” effect. Other 
countries had lower rates of IPO activity in the past and are simply catching up in the 2000s for reasons 
that have little to do with the quality of national institutions. There is, after all, a vast literature that 
focuses on the role of investor sentiment and growth opportunities for IPOs (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; 
Ritter, 2003), which may have influenced why IPO activity in the U.S. was more robust in the 1990s. A 
third possibility is that market conditions were relatively more attractive in the U.S. in the 1990s and 17 
became relatively more attractive in other countries in the 2000s. In the next section, we explore the 
importance of country characteristics as determinants of domestic IPO activity. In Section IV, we address 
the role of global IPOs. In Section V, we return to the issue of the decreasing share of world IPOs by the 
U.S. firms and show to what extent our analysis helps understand that decrease. We postpone discussion 
of the robustness of our results to Section VI. 
 
III. Do national institutions and market conditions matter for IPO activity around the world? 
To assess the importance of national laws and governance institutions, like corporate laws, securities 
laws, and the rule of law, as well as market conditions, such as economic growth and equity valuations in 
a country, we need to benchmark IPO activity in terms of both counts and proceeds relative to the extent 
of potential activity. The literature uses different approaches to gauge this potential activity. Previous 
work on IPO activity benchmarks counts relative to the population in a given country (LLSV, 1997) and 
the number of listed firms on the major exchanges (DLLS, 2008). Each choice has its advantages; we 
choose the latter because some of our country-level measures of economic development use population as 
a divisor which could lead to a mechanical relation statistically. IPO activity in terms of the proceeds of 
equity issued by newly-listed firms in a country is benchmarked relative to GDP by LLS (2006) and 
DLLS (2008) and relative to the total assets of the firms involved in raising capital (Kim and Weisbach, 
2008). The lagged market capitalization of listed firms would be a choice of normalization that would be 
consistent with our normalization for counts. However, some of the countries in our sample have very few 
public firms early in the sample period. If there is an especially large IPO in a year, ratios that involve 
assets or  market capitalization of listed firms become  outliers. We therefore choose to use GDP to 
normalize proceeds. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics by year for domestic IPO counts as a fraction of the previous 
year’s number of domestic listed firms (Panel a) and for domestic IPO proceeds as a fraction of the 
previous year’s GDP in millions of U.S. dollars (Panel b). Domestic IPO proceeds include proceeds from 
domestic IPOs only. We multiply both ratios by 100. An issue with using proceeds in our regressions is 18 
that there are some enormous IPOs. These mega-IPOs generate country-year outliers that can potentially 
distort inferences. For example, in 1998, NTT Mobile raised $23 billion (in 2007 dollars), accounting for 
89% of total IPO proceeds raised by Japanese firms that year. In contrast, the other 83 Japanese IPOs 
raised an average of $34 million in 1998. Therefore, we report results where we winsorize IPO proceeds 
across the sample at the top 5% and later discuss how the results differ without winsorizing the proceeds. 
For counts, ratios are winsorized at the 1% and 99% thresholds across all country-years. We restrict the 
analysis to the countries used in Tables 1 and 2 with sufficient data on changing market conditions that 
we include in the regressions below.
7 
Panel a shows that domestic IPO activity by count ranges from a low of 0.43% of listed firms in 1990 
to as high as 5.39% in 1994. We report means across countries and it should be noted that there is 
significant dispersion in activity across countries by year and, moreover, that the number of countries 
with non-zero IPO counts changes over time. Fewer countries have no IPOs when IPO markets are hot 
around the world than when they are cold. Specifically, the number of countries that have no IPOs in a 
year is negatively correlated with the worldwide average  of IPOs per number of listed firms.
8  This 
evidence suggests that world market conditions play an important role in IPO activity at the country level. 
We provide more such evidence in regressions that analyze country-level IPO rates. 
In Panel b, domestic IPO proceeds as a fraction of GDP ranges from a low of 0.03% in 1990 to a high 
of 0.20% in 1994. The time-variation in IPO proceeds across years follows closely the pattern in counts 
per number of listed firms, but not perfectly. This fact implies that there are interesting differences in the 
offering sizes of IPOs across years, part of which stem from the types of firms that go public and part of 
which stem from the countries of domicile that dominate IPO activity in those years. When we do not 
winsorize IPO proceeds at the top 5% to exclude the very large IPOs in our sample (not shown), the level 
                                                 
7 An important control variable in our regressions is country q. We require that a country have this data available for 
at least one year to qualify for the summary statistics in Table 3. This restriction eliminates 35 countries (which 
together constitute only 216 domestic IPOs out of 24,155 (and 95 global IPOs out of 5,186)) leaving 54 countries.  
8 We tested whether this relationship is statistically reliable using Tobit regressions of the percentage of countries 
with non-zero counts or proceeds on the mean IPO rate across countries by count or proceeds, respectively. There is 
a statistically significant negative coefficient for the proceeds relationship (coefficient of -1.30, t-statistic of -2.66) 
and a negative, but insignificant, coefficient for the same by counts. 19 
of the ratios is lower by 0.03%, on average, but the time-series variation across years is similar. The only 
exception is when ratios diverge in the last three years (2005-2007); it turns out that winsorized IPO 
proceeds as a fraction of GDP remain flat around 0.10%, but the ratio for IPO proceeds that are not 
winsorized rises to 0.20%. It is important to point out that the range of this fraction – however it is 
measured – is limited by the fact that proceeds are typically small relative to the GDP of a country. The 
maximum fraction of IPO proceeds in any country never exceeds 2% in any year. Again, there is a large 
fraction of countries that are counted in these means by year for which there are no IPO proceeds. 
A.  Understanding domestic IPO activity. 
Everything else being equal, we expect more IPOs in countries with better growth opportunities, with 
more economic development, and with higher financial development. We use GDP growth as a measure 
of growth opportunities, log(GDP/capita), market cap/GDP, and market turnover as measures of the level 
of economic and financial market development, and country q as a measure of corporate valuations in the 
country. Since we expect greater financial globalization to make it easier for firms to use global IPOs to 
go public and thereby rely less on raising capital using a domestic IPO, we include world financial 
globalization as an explanatory variable.
9 Each of these variables is lagged by one year. Lagging these 
variables is especially important for market capitalization and turnover since these variables would be 
directly affected by IPO activity. We estimate this model as a panel regression using ordinary least 
squares allowing the standard errors to be clustered by country. 
Table 4 presents the estimates for regressions that project measures of domestic IPO activity on 
measures of national institutions, financial globalization, development, and market conditions. The first 
six regressions use domestic IPO counts normalized by the lagged number of listed firms as the measure 
of IPO activity. Model (1), our base specification without any of the institution proxies included, shows 
that world financial globalization has a negative coefficient, -1.240, that is statistically significant and 
economically important. An increase from the average ratio of 139% of external assets/liabilities to world 
                                                 
9 The world financial globalization has no variation across countries in a given year. Therefore, we cannot include 
year dummies in the regressions. 20 
GDP in the 1990s to its average ratio of 252% in the 2000s is associated with a 1.40% decrease in the 
domestic IPO rate, which represents 40% of the unconditional average annual IPO rate in the 1990s. The 
domestic IPO rate increases in country q. The coefficient of 2.540 implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in q (0.18%) is associated with a 0.46% increase in the IPO rate, which constitutes 16% of its 
standard deviation. Similarly, GDP growth has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 5% level. 
The coefficients on market cap/GDP and market turnover are also  positive,  as expected, but are 
significant only at the 10% level. Finally,  economic development, as proxied by the log of GDP per 
capita, is not statistically significant. The explanatory power of this specification is reasonable with an 
adjusted R
2 of 14.1%. 
Model (7) presents the results of the same base regression for domestic IPO proceeds normalized by 
lagged GDP. The results are similar to those for counts. In this specification, world financial globalization 
has a negative coefficient that is statistically and economically significant. An expansion of external 
assets/liabilities as a ratio of world GDP from 139% in the 1990s to 252% in the 2000s is associated with 
decline of 0.059%, or about 38% of the average annual IPO rate during the 1990s, which is 51% of the 
standard deviation of domestic IPO proceeds. As with counts, the coefficients on country q and GDP 
growth are positive  and  statistically  significant. The coefficient on country q  has  a  larger  economic 
magnitude, corresponding to about 13% of the standard deviation of the IPO activity rate in proceeds. The 
coefficient on market turnover is positive and significant at the 10% level, while that for market cap/GDP 
is significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on the log of GDP per capita is negative and significant at 
the 10% level. The explanatory power of this base specification is again reasonable with an adjusted R
2 of 
18.4%. 
B.  National laws and governance institutions and domestic IPO activity. 
Models (2) to (6) and (8) to (12) each add to the base specifications of domestic IPO counts and 
proceeds, respectively, a country-level measure of laws and governance institutions, one at a time. The 
coefficient for the financial globalization variable declines slightly in magnitude, but remains negative 
and statistically significant at least at the 5% level when we add these institutions variables. Perhaps not 21 
surprisingly,  since institutions are correlated with financial development, the measures of financial 
development weaken in some specifications when we control for institutions. 
In general, we find that the better is the quality of the national institutions, the higher is the level of 
domestic IPO activity. In models (2) and (8), the addition of the common law dummy adds explanatory 
power to the base model. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level with a value of 1.54 
for domestic IPO counts and positive and significant at the 5% level with a value of 0.09 for domestic 
IPO proceeds. LLSV (1997) find similar results using counts of IPOs per millions in population for a two-
year period, 1995-1996. In contrast to their approach, we use a panel regression and account for market 
conditions. The positive coefficient on the anti-self-dealing index is positive and significant at the 1% 
level for both IPO counts and proceeds in models (3) and (9). For counts, the coefficient of 5.29 implies 
that a one standard deviation higher score in anti-self-dealing (say, from that of Switzerland to Canada) is 
associated with an increase of 1.26% in the domestic IPO rate, or 44% of its standard deviation. The 
economic magnitude of this variable is similar for proceeds. The adjusted R
2 increases substantially to 
20.6% (from 14.1% in the base specification) for counts and to 25.9% (from 18.4%) for proceeds.
10 
The next regressions include the securities laws measures developed in LLS (2006). We include the 
indexes for disclosure and for liability standards in models (4), (5), (10), and (11). LLS (2006) show these 
variables,  separately and together,  to be statistically and economically important for explaining IPO 
activity measured by proceeds for the high IPO activity period of 1996-2000 (their Tables III and V). We 
similarly find that the coefficients on these variables are important for both IPO counts and proceeds. For 
example, disclosure has a coefficient of 6.96 (t-statistic of 4.79) for IPO counts; this implies that a one 
standard deviation higher score (say, from that of Turkey to Spain) is associated with a 1.45% higher 
domestic  IPO  rate, which represents about 50%  of its standard deviation. The adjusted R
2  for this 
specification is 22.5%. Similarly strong results hold for the proceeds regression. The coefficient for the 
other index from LLS (2006) that  we use, liability standards, is significant, but less reliably  than 
                                                 
10 In Table 6 of DLLS (2008), the anti-self-dealing variable has a reliably positive coefficient of 4.14 for their 
specification on IPO proceeds relative to GDP, though with fewer control variables for the level of economic and 
financial development. They discuss the large economic significance of this variable (p. 449). 22 
disclosure.  That the results for disclosure are particularly strong is important support for the key 
prediction in Stulz (2009), where credible disclosure commitment ex ante and ex post by means of strong 
securities laws is critical for the entrepreneur to maximize offering proceeds. We also examine a measure 
of the rule of law in models (6) and (12). There is evidence of a positive relationship, but only for IPO 
counts (coefficient of 0.94 with t-statistic of 1.87). 
In Section II, we showed that the landscape of IPO activity changed dramatically during our sample 
period. In particular, the relative importance of U.S. IPOs fell sharply. These changes raise the question of 
whether the relation between IPO activity and institutions is stable through time or weakens with the rapid 
globalization of financial markets and with the rise of IPO activity around the world. As discussed in the 
introduction, there are good reasons to believe that globalization decreases the importance of national 
institutions. 
C.  Financial globalization and domestic IPO activity. 
Table 5 presents panel regression results of domestic IPO activity that are similar to those in Table 4, 
except that we  interact our  measure of world financial globalization with the institutions  variables 
(“Institutions × World financial globalization”). To preserve the interpretability of the coefficients (and to 
facilitate comparisons with those in Table 4), we de-mean the interacted variables across countries (each 
of the institutions variables, in turn) and across years (world financial globalization variable).
11 Indeed, 
the coefficients  on the variables that comprise the base specification, including the world financial 
globalization measure, are very similar in magnitude and statistical significance to those in Table 4. 
The interaction of the common law indicator variable with financial globalization is reliably negative 
for counts in model (1) and for proceeds in model (6). This weakening of the role of institutions as 
financial globalization increases arises for just about every national institution proxy variable that has a 
                                                 
11 Without de-meaning, the coefficient on the institutions variable in the regression with the interaction corresponds 
to the partial derivative of the dependent variable with respect to the institutions variable when the world financial 
globalization measure equals zero. This differs from the interpretation of the institutions variable in the regression 
without the interaction, where the interpretation of the coefficient on the institutions variable is the partial derivative 
when the world financial globalization measure is at its mean. By de-meaning, the interpretation of the coefficient 
on the institutions variable in the regression with the interaction is the same as that in regression without the 
interaction. See Ozer-Balli and Sorensen (2010). 23 
reliably positive coefficient in Table 4. In particular, financial globalization sharply reduces the positive 
impact of the anti-self-dealing and disclosure variables in models (2) and (3) for counts and in models (7) 
and (8) for proceeds. Consider the economic importance of this phenomenon for the example of the 
specification with the anti-self-dealing index. In model (3) of Table 4, we showed that a one-standard-
deviation higher index score in anti-self-dealing (such as, from Switzerland to Canada) is associated with 
a 1.26% higher domestic IPO rate measured by counts. In model (2) of Table 5, we can compute how 
different the impact of such a higher score is in the 1990s when the level of financial globalization was 
lower (world financial globalization averaged 139% of world GDP) and in the 2000s when it was higher 
(it averaged 252% of world GDP). A one-standard-deviation increase is associated with a 1.44% higher 
domestic IPO rate during the 1990s and with only a 0.92% higher rate during the 2000s. At the peak of 
financial globalization in our sample period, none of the institutions variables have any impact on the 
domestic IPO rate measured using counts. When we consider the IPO rate measured using proceeds in 
Panel b, none of the institutions variables have a notable impact on the domestic IPO rate when financial 
globalization is at its peak. 
It is interesting to note that the countries that were most important for IPO activity in the 1990s, when 
the level of financial globalization was lower, lost importance in the 2000s, when the level was higher. 
The countries that were predominant in the 1990s, such as the U.S., U.K., Singapore, Australia, and Hong 
Kong, ceded substantial IPO share to a number of other countries with sizeable IPO activity in the 2000s, 
but with typically poorer institutions. This shift in IPO activity across countries is consistent with a 
decrease in the importance of institutions since, had institutions remained as important as in the 1990s, 
the regressions would predict that the countries that gained prominence in IPO activity in the 2000s 
would not have done so. 
Our findings to now broadly support the law and finance theories outlined in the introduction which 
predict a positive relation between IPO activity and the quality of institutions and a weakening role for 
institutions for domestic IPO activity as financial globalization increases. Recall from SW (2002) that 
firms are larger, more valuable, and greater in number with higher dividends and less diversion of profits 24 
if legal protections are better. An important corollary of the SW model, however, is that more open capital 
markets are associated with greater IPO activity in a given country and that any differences in investor 
protection laws across countries will diminish in importance. More open markets enable firms to take 
advantage of financial development, the economic development, and the institutions of foreign countries. 
In the next section, we provide evidence in support of these particular predictions. We document that 
countries with weaker institutions have higher  rates of global IPO activity  relative to domestic IPO 
activity compared to countries with stronger institutions. 
 
IV. The consequences of financial globalization for global IPO activity around the world. 
The evidence in Section II shows that IPOs in the rest of the world became much more important and 
IPOs in the U.S. became less important. We provided further evidence in Section III that a country’s 
institutions, whether corporate laws, securities laws, disclosure rules, or their enforcement in general, 
became a less important factor for the extent of domestic IPO activity. One possible explanation is that 
countries’ institutions  became less important  because of the emergence of global IPOs.  Financial 
globalization made it increasingly easier for firms wanting to pursue IPOs to avoid being hindered by 
domestic institutional obstacles and to benefit from institutions and resources from countries other than 
their own.
12  Indeed, firms in many  countries  pursue  IPOs in foreign markets or, at least, include 
international tranches in their IPOs. In this section, we investigate whether this pursuit is related to the 
quality of national institutions  and whether or not this relationship changes  over time  with greater 
financial globalization. 
A.  Understanding global IPO activity. 
In Table 6, we report the results of panel regressions that are similar to those of Table 4, except that 
we focus on the relative importance of global versus domestic IPOs. Our dependent variable for counts is 
the number of global IPOs minus the number of domestic IPOs normalized by the number of listed firms. 
                                                 
12 This benefit takes many forms. For 50 randomly-chosen global IPOs in our sample, we investigated whether firms 
that use global markets for their IPOs also tend to use foreign auditors, law firms, and underwriters. We found that 
this is the case, indicating that firms that have global IPOs also make use of monitors from outside of their country. 25 
It is important to benchmark the global IPO rate of activity against the domestic rate in order to interpret 
most effectively the economic consequences of financial globalization.  We  present the results for 
proceeds similarly.  Global counts include foreign IPOs as well as global IPOs with  a domestic and 
international tranche. Global IPO proceeds include the U.S. dollar proceeds of foreign IPOs as well as 
those from the international  tranches of global IPOs (proceeds assigned to the domestic tranche are 
excluded). An increase in our dependent variable means that global IPOs are becoming more important 
for a country relative to domestic IPOs. From our earlier discussion, we expect the dependent variable to 
increase with financial globalization, to decrease with domestic financial and economic development, and 
to decrease with the quality of the domestic laws and institutions of governance. 
In addition to controlling for country q, we also control for world q in these regressions to measure 
valuation benefits that can potentially be captured by a global offering. The coefficient on world q is 
positive and significant, both in the base model (1) for counts at the 10% level and in the base model (7) 
for proceeds at the 1% level. The coefficients on the world q show that global market conditions have a 
strong impact on global IPO activity. Country q is insignificant in both regressions. The coefficient on 
market turnover is negative and significant in both regressions, while that for market capitalization to 
GDP is negative and significant in the count regressions. These results indicate that firms use global IPOs 
partly to access better developed financial markets. 
For both global counts and proceeds, financial globalization has a significant positive coefficient, 
which implies that global IPO activity increases with financial globalization, as expected. If we compare 
the level of financial globalization in the 1990s (average ratio of external assets/liabilities to world GDP 
of 139%) to that in the 2000s (average ratio of 252%), the coefficient of 1.36 for global IPO counts 
implies a 1.51% higher annual global IPO rate in excess of the domestic rate, which is a very large gain 
since over the entire sample the domestic IPO rate exceeds the global IPO rate on average by 1.15%.  For 
global IPO proceeds, the positive coefficient of 0.055 on financial globalization implies a 0.061% higher 
global IPO rate in excess of the domestic rate, which is still a reasonable gain relative to the mean annual 
excess rate of rate of domestic IPOs in excess of global IPOs of 0.39%. 26 
B.  National laws and governance institutions and global IPO activity. 
To the base  regressions in Table 6, we add one institutions proxy variable in each subsequent 
regression both for counts and proceeds as in Table 4. We expect that global IPOs are less important 
relative to domestic IPOs in countries with better institutions. In the count  regressions, we find a 
significant negative coefficient on each institutions variable. Both the anti-self-dealing and the disclosure 
indexes in models (3) and (4) have negative coefficients that are significant at the 1% level. It is striking 
that adding the anti-self-dealing index to the base regression increases the adjusted R
2 by 50%, from 
12.5% to 18.6%. To understand the economic significance of these coefficients, consider the impact of a 
one standard deviation increase in the anti-self-dealing index. With such a change, the dependent variable 
decreases by 1.24%, or 36%  of its standard deviation. For proceeds, we find that the common law 
dummy, anti-self-dealing, and disclosure have significant negative coefficients. Liability standards and 
rule of law have negative, but insignificant coefficients. The institutions variables do not add as much to 
the explanatory power of the base regression in the proceeds regressions as they do in the count 
regressions. 
In the previous section, we showed that national institutions became less important determinants of 
domestic IPO activity as globalization increased. We now investigate whether this is the case for the 
relative importance of global versus domestic IPOs. 
C.  Financial globalization and global IPO activity. 
A country with better legal and governance institutions should have more domestic IPOs. When a 
country’s domestic institutions are at the top of the range of quality of domestic institutions, the country 
should have no global IPOs if the only benefit of global IPOs is to take advantage of institutions from 
other countries. However, it is clear from our evidence that global IPOs are advantageous for other 
reasons as well. Consider, for example, the role of world q, our proxy for the valuation benefits that firms 
can potentially seize with a global offering. We find that many U.S. IPOs were global IPOs in the late 
1990s, but the proceeds raised through global IPOs by U.S. firms were negligible in the 2000s. While 27 
global IPOs could have made it easier for U.S. firms to access foreign investors, it seems unlikely that 
they would have done so in order to take advantage of higher quality foreign institutions.  
In Table 7, we allow  the institutions  proxy  variables  to interact with the financial globalization 
measure  to test whether the negative relationship between global IPO activity and the quality of 
institutions weakens with increasing financial globalization. Indeed, we find that domestic institutions 
became less important determinants of the relative importance of global IPOs for a country as financial 
globalization increased. In particular, for the count regressions, the interactions of the common law 
dummy, anti-self-dealing, and disclosure, with world financial globalization (in models (1), (2), and (3), 
respectively) have coefficients that are positive and significant at the 5% level or better. The interactions 
are not significant for the other institutions variables. The results are similar, but slightly weaker for 
proceeds. To gauge the economic importance of financial globalization, consider that, during the 1990s 
when financial globalization was lower (external assets/liabilities as a ratio of world GDP was 139%, on 
average), a one standard deviation lower score on anti-self-dealing (for Switzerland compared to Canada, 
for example) was associated with a higher global IPO rate (in excess of the domestic rate) of 1.51% per 
year (using model (3) in Table 6 for global IPO counts). During the 2000s when financial globalization 
was higher (external assets/liabilities to world GDP of 252%, on average), a similar one standard 
deviation lower score was associated with only a 0.79% higher global IPO rate per year. The economic 
consequence of lower quality institutions for global IPO activity in the 2000s with expanded globalization 
of markets is fully half that in the 1990s. 
What is the bottom-line of our findings on the relative importance of global IPOs? As we would 
expect, global IPOs are a way for firms to exploit the better institutions of foreign countries to have a 
successful or more profitable IPO. The advantage of the better institutions in foreign countries is inversely 
related to the quality of a firm’s domestic institutions, so that it is not surprising that domestic institutions 
play an offsetting role for global and domestic IPOs. We find that institutions become less important for 
global IPOs, in that financial globalization is associated with a reduction of the negative coefficient on 28 
institutions variables. This effect is strong for the common law dummy, the anti-self-dealing index, and 
the disclosure index, but does not exist for the liability standards and rule of law indexes. 
 
V. The consequence for the U.S. of financial globalization and the rise of IPOs outside the U.S. 
In the last two sections, we showed that financial globalization is associated with an increase in global 
IPO activity and a decrease in the importance of institutions as a determinant of IPO activity. We also 
showed in Section II that the U.S. share of worldwide IPO activity fell and that this fall is not due to a 
decrease in the economic importance of the U.S. In this section, we tie these two sets of results together 
by showing that the rate of IPOs outside of the U.S. has increased with globalization. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, we showed that non-U.S. countries had more IPOs, on average, than predicted by our model, 
implying that the U.S. had fewer IPOs than expected based on our model. 
To assess the impact of globalization on the total rate of IPO activity outside the U.S., we proceed as 
follows. In Table 8, we estimate regressions that predict the total IPO rate of a country. Note that the 
dependent variables in these regressions include both global and domestic IPO counts and proceeds which 
are different than those in Tables 4 and 5, which include domestic IPOs only. These regressions are 
designed to help understand whether there is a differential effect of globalization on the total IPO activity 
in  non-U.S. countries.  We use the independent variables as  in Table 4, but include two additional 
variables. First, we include a dummy variable that equals one for non-U.S. countries and zero, for the U.S. 
(“Non-U.S. dummy”). Second, we include  an interaction of the non-U.S. dummy  variable  with the 
financial globalization variable (“Non-U.S. dummy × World financial globalization”). As in Table 5, we 
de-mean these variables. 
Table 8, Panel a shows results for total IPO counts normalized by the lagged number of domestic 
listed firms. Each year, the total IPO count for a country includes domestic and global IPOs. The non-
U.S. dummy has a positive and significant coefficient. This means that, on average, non-U.S. countries 
have more IPOs over the sample period than predicted by our model. The coefficient value of 1.465 in 
model (2), for example, using anti-self-dealing as the institutions proxy variable implies a 37.4% higher 29 
total IPO rate than the average rate among non-U.S. countries of 3.919% for the whole sample period. By 
the same token, this result implies that the U.S. had fewer IPOs over the sample period than expected by 
our model. In other words, there are “missing” U.S. IPOs. Although explaining these missing IPOs is 
beyond the objective of our paper, we checked whether the “missing” IPOs phenomenon occurs in other 
western industrialized countries, such as Germany, France, the U.K., and others. We find that this is not 
the case. Surprisingly, the coefficient on financial globalization itself is significantly negative at the 5% 
level in three out of five specifications and at the 10% level in one. Financial globalization decreases the 
rate of domestic IPO activity and increases the rate of global IPO activity. Since global IPO activity arises 
mostly in countries outside the U.S. during the 2000s, global IPOs can only contribute to the increase of 
IPO activity in these non-U.S. countries. 
The second result of note is that the interaction between the non-U.S. dummy and the globalization 
variable is positive and significant. A positive coefficient means that expanded globalization increased the 
total IPO rate of non-U.S. countries relative to that of the U.S. To measure the economic magnitude of 
this effect, consider that the higher than expected rate of IPO activity among non-U.S. countries implied 
by our model is only 0.815% in the 1990s (when external assets and liabilities comprised about 139% of 
world GDP) and rises to  as high as 2.259% in the 2000s (when external assets and liabilities comprised 
252% of world GDP). In the 2000s, this rate constitutes 57.6% of the average total IPO rate of activity 
outside the U.S. 
Panel b presents  regressions that explain total IPO proceeds. Total proceeds  include  the sum of 
domestic IPO proceeds and global IPO proceeds. As before, proceeds are normalized by GDP. The results 
for proceeds are similar to those for counts. The coefficient on the non-U.S. countries is positive and 
significant at the 1% level in each regression. As with counts, the interaction between the non-U.S. 
dummy and financial globalization is also positive and significant at the 1% level. The significance of the 
coefficient on financial globalization is lower  in the proceeds regressions  compared to the count 
regressions. However, the economic magnitudes implied by the total IPO proceeds outside the U.S. are 
large, on average, and much larger during the 2000s when financial globalization was much greater. 30 
It follows from these results that financial globalization helps explain the growth of IPOs abroad 
relative to the U.S. That is, the decrease in the U.S. share of world IPO activity can be partly attributed to 
the impact of financial globalization on non-U.S. countries. 
 
VI. Robustness tests. 
There are several potential concerns with our sample of IPOs, the institutions variables we use, the 
regression tests, and our inferences from those tests. We performed a number of robustness checks to 
assess the magnitude of those concerns, focusing mainly on the regressions in Tables 4 and 6 that use the 
anti-self-dealing index as the proxy for national institutions. In Table 9, we report the results from a 
number of key checks; Panels a and b show results for domestic IPO counts and proceeds, while Panels c 
and d show results for global IPO counts and proceeds. At the end of this section, we discuss, but do not 
report, findings from a number of additional tests. 
In Section I, we discussed how our screening process sought to eliminate mistakes in the SDC 
database and compared our data to alternative samples, including one compiled by Professor Jay Ritter, 
which is mostly from Dealogic. This sample contains information on annual total IPO counts by country. 
To check whether our inferences about the role of institutions are affected by these different samples we 
generate a new dependent variable, the total IPO rate for counts that uses the maximum of the counts per 
country-year from the two samples for the 46 countries common to the SDC and Ritter samples. We then 
re-estimate the regressions in Panel a of Table 4. Model (1) in Table 9 (Panel a) presents the results for 
the IPO counts using anti-self-dealing as the institutions variable. The coefficient on world financial 
globalization is still reliably negative, the coefficients on country q and GDP growth are reliably positive, 
and the positive coefficient on anti-self-dealing is statistically and economically significant. 
A  second  concern with our data is the potential distortions that arise from very large IPOs that 
generate large outliers in country-year IPO rates based on proceeds. As discussed in Section III, we dealt 
with this problem by winsorizing the proceeds of the largest 5% of IPOs. In model (5) (Panel b) and 
model (11) (in Panel d), we re-estimate the regressions for domestic and global IPO proceeds without this 31 
constraint and use actual proceeds to compute IPO rates. For both domestic and global IPOs, inferences 
are similar to the corresponding ones reported in Tables 4 and 6, except that the coefficient on world 
financial globalization loses significance (in untabulated results that use alternate institutions variables, it 
is significant at the 10% level). 
Our tests use data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (LMF, 2007) to measure financial globalization. This 
measure is constructed from the total external assets and liabilities across our sample countries. As an 
alternate measure of globalization, we use the “KOF Index of Globalization,” an index built by the KOF 
Swiss Economic Institute (www.globalization.kof.ethz.ch). It measures economic as well as social and 
political dimensions of globalization and is available for a large number of countries over our sample 
period. We focus on the economic globalization sub-index, which gives 50% weight to actual flows 
(trade, FDI, portfolio investment, and income payments to foreigners) and 50% weight to restrictions 
(import barriers, tariffs, taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions). As with the LMF 
financial globalization measure, we aggregate the country-level indexes to a world-level index. Models 
(2) and (6) in Panels a and b of Table 9 present the results for domestic IPO counts and proceeds while 
models (9) and (12) in Panels c and d present results for global IPO counts and proceeds. In all cases, the 
results are similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 6. Most notably, the KOF index has a negative and 
significant coefficient for domestic IPOs and a positive, significant coefficient for global IPOs. We also 
checked an alternate version of the LMF measure that uses only external equity assets and liabilities, thus 
excluding debt, derivatives, and currency reserves. Again, the results are similar (not reported). 
Legal and governance institutions could change over time because of the market’s demand for IPOs 
so that the quality of institutions in a country could be endogenous to IPO activity that takes place there. 
This concern is not plausible with the common law  dummy. Yet, we find evidence of a reliable 
association of common law with IPO activity. The endogeneity concern is likely to be more acute with the 
other national institutions variables. To evaluate this potential problem, we estimate our domestic and 
global IPO activity regression models using instrumental variables (two-stage least squares). The 
institutions variables are regressed on the common law indicator along with world financial globalization, 32 
country  q,  GDP growth, market cap/GDP,  market turnover, and  log (GDP/capita) in a first-stage 
regression (for global IPOs it also includes world q). In the second-stage regression, the predicted values 
of the institutions variables are used instead of the actual values. We report the second-stage results in 
Table 9. Models (3) and (7) show results for domestic IPO counts and proceeds while models (10) and 
(13) show results for global IPO counts and proceeds. The coefficients on anti-self-dealing and world 
financial globalization are always statistically significant with the same signs and similar magnitudes as 
the equivalent specifications in Tables 4 and 6. 
One concern with our model specification for domestic IPOs is that the dependent variable, measured 
as a rate of IPO activity, is censored at zero. Potential demand for IPOs among firms that did not choose 
to go public is unobserved. Truncation or censoring can induce a form of omitted-variable bias when the 
regression is estimated by ordinary least squares. To evaluate the importance of this bias, we re-estimate 
the domestic IPO regressions using Tobit models. Models (4) and (8) in Table 9 show that the results are 
similar to those reported in Table 4. In particular, the coefficients on the anti-self-dealing and world 
financial globalization variables have the correct signs and are statistically significant. 
In addition to the robustness checks reported in Table 9, we conduct a number of other tests that are 
not reported. In our main results, we focus on five institutions variables and explained why we chose 
them in Section I. We also estimate regressions that use other variables to proxy for institutions. First, we 
use the anti-director rights index of LLSV (1998) and updated and revised by DLLS (2008), a popular 
index of legal protections for minority investors. Second, we use an index of public enforcement from 
LLS (2006) that focuses on powers of the supervisory body for securities markets to issue sanctions and a 
measure of public enforcement based on regulatory budgets and staffing levels of securities market 
regulators from Jackson and Roe (2009). Third, we include  a measure of political risk from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database built by The PRS Group, Inc. Finally, we use a 
measure of insider ownership from LLSV (1998) which is computed as the average percentage of shares 
owned by the top three shareholders in the 10 largest nonfinancial private domestic firms in a country. 
The law and finance literature implies that a key mechanism through which poor institutions limit IPO 33 
activity is that they require more co-investment by insiders. As a result, fewer IPOs should occur in 
countries where insider ownership is optimally higher. We find that our results are reliable for both 
domestic and global IPOs, except when using the ICRG political risk proxy and the revised anti-director 
rights index. 
Another potential issue with the institutions variables is that institutions affect the level of financial 
and economic development in a country. Consequently, we might understate the influence of institutions 
by allowing other variables to have explanatory power. To gauge this concern, we re-estimate our 
regressions without the financial and economic development variables and find that key inferences on the 
institution proxy variables and world financial globalization change very little. In a similar line of 
reasoning, part of the decline in the importance of the institution proxy variables with globalization that 
we observe in Table 5 for domestic IPO activity and in Table 7 for global IPO activity may reflect the 
interaction with other financial and economic development indicators that we suppress in those tests. 
When we add those additional interactions to the regressions, we find that few of them are reliably 
significant and that none of them impede the reliability of the interaction with the anti-self-dealing index. 
A concern with our model specifications is that we ignore potential common sources of variation that 
can influence IPO activity around the world beyond those captured in our economic and financial 
variables. This common variation can be influenced by financial globalization and we excluded it from 
our main tests to identify more directly the impact of financial globalization. To assess the importance of 
capturing such common variation, we constructed world domestic and global IPO rates in terms of IPO 
counts per number of listed firms or in terms of IPO proceeds per GDP. These rates are summed across 
countries each year on a weighted basis where the country weights are the lagged total number of listed 
firms or lagged GDP. For a given country, the world IPO rates are computed excluding IPOs from the 
country of interest. When we add the world IPO rates to the regressions, the coefficients are positive and 
significant in all specifications. As expected, the reliability of the coefficient on world globalization 34 
diminishes, but remains statistically significant in most specifications. However, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients on the institutions variables change very little.
13 
Next, we investigate whether domestic sources of funding that could substitute for domestic IPOs – 
that is, the potential demand for IPOs that we do not observe – can explain the decrease in the role of 
institutions for IPO activity that we document. Instead of going public, pre-IPO private firms could be 
acquired so that they would be able to invest more or so that insiders could cash out. Alternatively, firms 
could use debt instead of equity financing to fund their needs. To test these ideas, we estimate regressions 
of domestic IPO activity that control for the number of acquisitions of private firms in the country in the 
preceding year scaled by the number of listed domestic firms, all obtained from SDC. We also control for 
the level of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions (as a fraction of GDP in 
the preceding year, obtained from the original and updates of the Financial and Structure database in 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000)). Including these control variables does not change our key 
inferences. 
To address concerns about details of our sample construction, we conduct several additional tests. 
First, we repeat our regressions for a sample that excludes all privatizations, which might be motivated by 
special objectives of the government. We also repeat our regressions for another sample that counts 
Chinese IPOs that list in Hong Kong as domestic IPOs, even though they are subject to different laws and 
regulations as a result of the Hong Kong listing. Since our regressions are at the country-year level, these 
alternative samples do not reduce in any significant way the number of observations in our regressions 
and the results are consistent with the results we report. As a final check on the sample construction, we 
expand the sample to include country-years of IPO activity that were previously excluded for which both 
GDP and country q were not available. The overall explanatory power of the regression models decline, 
but key inferences associated with our other control variables and institutions variables remain. 
                                                 
13 In additional tests, we re-estimate the models where the t-statistics are computed from standard errors that are 
double-clustered on both years and countries. The results are similar to what we report. 35 
Finally, we investigate the “catching up” hypothesis discussed earlier. We re-estimate the regression 
models of Table 4 adding a lagged dependent variable in the model. The catching-up hypothesis implies a 
mean-reverting process in IPO activity so that a country with a high (low) IPO rate in the past would be 
expected to have a lower (higher) rate in the future. We find no support for this hypothesis and, if 
anything, we uncover evidence of positive autocorrelation in the IPO series. 
 
V. Conclusions. 
This paper documents dramatic changes in the IPO landscape around the world over the past two 
decades. U.S. IPOs have become less important and IPOs in other countries have become more important, 
whether one looks at counts or at proceeds. In fact, U.S. IPO activity has generally not kept pace with the 
economic importance of the U.S. We show that financial globalization plays a critical role in facilitating 
the increasing importance of IPOs by non-U.S. firms. 
Financial globalization makes it easier  for firms to have global IPOs,  which enables them to 
overcome the adverse effects of weaker institutions in their home country. Greater globalization also 
affects the monitoring of firms, as holdings by institutional investors grow throughout the world. With 
greater financial globalization, a country’s local institutions are less important for the domestic IPO rate. 
In addition, greater financial globalization is associated with an increase in the rate of global IPO activity. 
Global IPOs played a critical role in increasing the importance of IPOs by non-U.S. firms. Though 
firms in countries with weaker institutions are less likely to go public with a domestic IPO, they are more 
likely to go public with a global IPO. That is, global IPOs enable firms to overcome poor institutions in 
their country of origin. Perhaps as a result, the laws and institutions of a firm’s country of origin have 
become significantly less important in affecting the rate and pace of IPO activity in a country. Of course, 
there are also other important drivers of domestic and global IPO activity, such as domestic and world 
valuations. 
Our paper leaves open some important issues. First, although we find clear evidence that institutions 
became less important in affecting a country’s IPO activity, it could be that laws and regulations that we 36 
do not account for still affect IPO activity. Further work should, therefore, examine the impact of changes 
in laws that are not captured by our institutional proxy variables. Second, we do not investigate the impact 
of financial globalization on individual IPOs. A detailed study of how firms going public in financially-
open countries actually  make use of institutions and resources from other countries would help in 
understanding better the impact of financial globalization on IPO activity. Finally, our focus is resolutely 
on cross-country variation in IPO activity; though our model shows that the U.S. IPO rate is abnormally 
low in the 2000s, we do not explain it. More work, like that of Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2012), should seek to 
address that abnormally low U.S. IPO rate and explain it.  
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Table 1. The IPO sample: 1990 to 2007. 
The initial sample includes 38,722 observations from 1990 to 2007 that SDC identifies as an IPO. IPOs with a 
single domestic tranche flagged as a private placement, global offers with tranches that have issue dates 30 or 
more days apart, transactions that do not contain any information on proceeds raised or SIC codes, and IPOs 
by REITs and investment funds are excluded. IPOs where the country of origin has no data and IPOs from 
countries where there were no domestic IPOs (only global IPOs) during the sample period are also excluded. 
SDC records data for some IPOs over multiple lines. These observations are consolidated into one line. The 
final sample includes 29,341 IPOs from 89 countries. Of these, 24,155 are domestic IPOs and 5,186 are global 
IPOs (IPOs in which some or all of the shares are sold outside the home country of the firm going public). 
Panel a shows IPO counts and Panel b shows IPOs proceeds. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds 
raised in the domestic tranche of global IPOs. For global IPOs, the panel reports total proceeds raised in global 
IPOs (proceeds raised in the domestic and international tranches) and global proceeds raised in global IPOs 
(proceeds raised in the international tranches only). Proceeds are in constant 2007 U.S. dollars (billions). 
  Panel a. IPO counts. 
Year  All IPOs  Domestic IPOs  Global IPOs 
       
1990  303  248  55 
1991  891  804  87 
1992  1,336  1,211  125 
1993  2,077  1,860  217 
1994  2,731  2,475  256 
1995  2,685  2,434  251 
1996  3,099  2,766  333 
1997  1,958  1,581  377 
1998  1,232  922  310 
1999  1,588  1,006  582 
2000  2,117  1,453  664 
2001  971  798  173 
2002  914  809  105 
2003  908  813  95 
2004  1,529  1,303  226 
2005  1,473  1,231  242 
2006  1,679  1,325  354 
2007  1,850  1,116  734 
       
Total  29,341  24,155  5,186 
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Table 1, continued. 
  Panel b. IPO proceeds. 
Year  All IPOs  Domestic IPOs  Global IPOs: total  Global IPOs: 
global only 
         
1990  $29.6  $18.5  $11.1  $8.8 
1991  $71.7  $37.9  $33.8  $17.4 
1992  $60.5  $35.5  $25.0  $10.4 
1993  $147.5  $92.1  $55.5  $26.6 
1994  $149.6  $77.7  $71.9  $37.9 
1995  $116.0  $47.2  $68.8  $35.0 
1996  $168.4  $81.7  $86.7  $45.2 
1997  $179.6  $69.8  $109.8  $49.0 
1998  $138.2  $32.6  $105.6  $39.7 
1999  $206.9  $59.3  $147.6  $57.3 
2000  $242.2  $51.8  $190.4  $94.0 
2001  $108.1  $35.7  $72.4  $32.0 
2002  $76.5  $46.7  $29.7  $16.3 
2003  $59.0  $34.8  $24.3  $15.9 
2004  $133.8  $62.4  $71.3  $44.8 
2005  $149.4  $82.9  $66.5  $52.0 
2006  $223.7  $123.8  $100.0  $87.9 
2007  $278.6  $89.9  $188.7  $168.8 
         
Total  $2,539.3  $1,080.3  $1,459.0  $838.8 
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Table 2. IPO activity for the top 25 countries around the world: 1990 to 2007. 
IPO data is from SDC and includes 29,341 IPOs from 89 countries over the period from 1990 to 2007. Panel a 
lists the top 25 countries based on total IPO counts. Panel b lists the top 25 countries based on total IPO 
proceeds. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds raised in the domestic tranche of global IPOs. For 
global IPOs the panel reports total proceeds raised in global IPOs (proceeds raised in the domestic and 
international tranches) and global proceeds raised in global IPOs (proceeds raised in the international tranches 
only). Proceeds are in constant 2007 U.S. dollars (billions). 
  Panel a. IPO counts. 
Country  All IPOs  Domestic IPOs  Global IPOs 
       
United States  6,126  4,932  1,194 
India  4,867  4,777  90 
Japan  2,234  2,131  103 
Canada  2,224  2,023  201 
China  1,764  1,300  464 
United Kingdom  1,649  1,372  277 
Australia  1,557  1,401  156 
Hong Kong  822  546  276 
Taiwan  822  808  14 
South Korea  775  751  24 
France  748  503  245 
Malaysia  722  697  25 
Germany  573  288  285 
Singapore  486  410  76 
Thailand  408  333  75 
Indonesia  274  189  85 
Pakistan  249  247  2 
Italy  243  54  189 
Greece  185  148  37 
Norway  178  123  55 
Poland  175  133  42 
Israel  155  13  142 
Sweden  142  53  89 
Brazil  128  60  68 
Netherlands  120  26  94 
       
Total: top 25  27,626  23,318  4,308 
       
Rest of world  1,715  837  878 
       
Total: all countries  29,341  24,155  5,186 
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Table 2, continued. 
  Panel b. IPO proceeds. 
Country  All IPOs  Domestic IPOs  Global IPOs: total  Global IPOs: 
global only 
         
United States  $647.7  $352.4  $295.3  $61.5 
China  $254.6  $110.0  $144.5  $133.1 
Japan  $204.1  $135.2  $68.9  $22.1 
United Kingdom  $196.1  $78.3  $117.9  $65.1 
France  $114.3  $9.7  $104.5  $52.2 
Germany  $106.6  $27.6  $79.1  $45.0 
Italy  $84.0  $9.7  $74.3  $32.1 
Australia  $76.3  $34.4  $41.9  $18.8 
Canada  $68.6  $47.7  $20.8  $15.1 
Hong Kong  $63.6  $13.0  $50.6  $41.9 
South Korea  $54.1  $46.0  $8.1  $6.6 
Russian Federation  $43.6  $13.9  $29.7  $29.7 
Spain  $41.5  $3.2  $38.3  $18.2 
Netherlands  $39.6  $4.1  $35.4  $28.2 
Brazil  $39.3  $14.9  $24.4  $23.3 
Switzerland  $37.1  $9.6  $27.5  $20.2 
Sweden  $32.4  $3.4  $28.9  $16.6 
India  $32.2  $17.8  $14.5  $12.5 
Taiwan  $27.1  $25.5  $1.6  $1.5 
Bermuda  $26.5  $0.1  $26.4  $26.4 
Thailand  $22.9  $11.0  $11.9  $6.5 
Indonesia  $20.7  $5.0  $15.7  $10.4 
Singapore  $19.7  $8.3  $11.4  $9.4 
Mexico  $19.4  $7.0  $12.3  $10.0 
Norway  $18.5  $6.7  $11.8  $8.4 
         
Total: top 25  $2,290.4  $994.5  $1,295.9  $715.0 
         
Rest of world  $248.9  $85.8  $163.1  $123.8 
         
Total: all countries  $2,539.3  $1,080.3  $1,459.0  $838.8 
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Table 3. Domestic IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
IPO data is from SDC and includes 23,939 domestic IPOs from 54 countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during 
the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each country, domestic IPO counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows annual summary 
statistics for domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. Panel b shows annual summary statistics for domestic IPO proceeds 
(winsorized at the top 5%) scaled by lagged GDP. Both measures are multiplied by 100. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the 
domestic tranche of global IPOs. The count measure is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. Country-years with no data for the number of domestic 
firms or GDP are excluded. 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
  Panel a. Domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. 
                                     
Mean  0.429  2.835  4.017  4.463  5.387  2.798  3.346  3.263  1.868  2.324  2.899  1.625  1.559  1.483  2.101  2.136  2.274  2.183 
Median  0.000  0.000  0.784  0.905  1.858  1.075  0.976  0.770  0.566  0.363  0.847  0.000  0.295  0.000  0.405  1.090  1.376  1.207 
Std deviation  0.938  5.250  6.244  6.583  6.874  4.659  5.406  5.274  3.017  3.472  4.214  2.583  2.424  2.668  3.293  2.907  2.456  3.315 
Minimum  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Maximum  3.704  25.234  25.234  25.234  25.234  25.234  25.234  25.234  12.827  15.164  16.901  10.923  10.103  14.734  13.752  13.855  10.103  19.476 
# of countries 
with zero IPOs 
33  25  21  17  15  22  22  16  21  24  19  29  25  28  19  16  13  13 
                                   
                                     
  Panel b. Domestic IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP. 
                                     
Mean  0.032  0.104  0.135  0.180  0.202  0.094  0.122  0.125  0.052  0.125  0.104  0.039  0.058  0.059  0.078  0.103  0.090  0.096 
Median  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.032  0.018  0.011  0.009  0.016  0.007  0.016  0.024  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.003  0.056  0.073  0.045 
Std deviation  0.100  0.203  0.263  0.335  0.295  0.136  0.231  0.236  0.093  0.329  0.197  0.078  0.108  0.118  0.130  0.130  0.087  0.168 
Minimum  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Maximum  0.521  0.810  1.222  1.409  1.129  0.475  1.149  1.107  0.485  2.125  1.050  0.287  0.493  0.546  0.502  0.516  0.346  1.116 
# of countries 
with zero IPOs 
38  30  25  20  19  23  23  17  21  24  19  29  25  28  19  16  13  12 
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Table 4. Determinants of domestic IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
The dependent variable is each country’s annual measure of domestic IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 23,939 domestic IPOs from 54 
countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each country, domestic 
IPO counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows regressions where the dependent variable is domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged 
number of domestic firms. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is domestic IPO proceeds (winsorized at the top 5%) scaled by lagged 
GDP. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the domestic tranche of global IPOs. Both measures of domestic IPO activity are multiplied 
by 100. The count measure is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. Country-years with no data for the number of domestic firms or GDP are 
excluded. With the exception of the institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Variables are defined in Appendix B. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within 
countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Domestic IPO counts. 
 
Panel b. Domestic IPO proceeds. 
 
 
 
(1) 
Common 
law 
(2) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(3) 
 
Disclosure 
(4) 
Liability 
standards 
(5) 
Rule of 
law 
(6) 
   
 
(7) 
Common 
law 
(8) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(9) 
 
Disclosure 
(10) 
Liability 
standards 
(11) 
Rule of 
law 
(12) 
                           
Constant  1.096  -0.414  -2.136  -5.975
**  -2.206  5.152    0.141  0.051  -0.013  -0.111  0.026  0.292
* 
  (0.49)  (-0.15)  (-0.99)  (-2.49)  (-1.03)  (1.53)    (1.44)  (0.45)  (-0.14)  (-1.10)  (0.27)  (1.91) 
Institutions variable    1.539
*  5.290
***  6.956
***  2.664
*  0.941
*      0.092
***  0.252
***  0.245
***  0.085
*  0.035 
    (1.86)  (4.34)  (4.79)  (1.96)  (1.87)      (2.87)  (4.35)  (3.36)  (1.95)  (1.60) 
World financial globalization  -1.240
***  -1.144
***  -0.985
***  -0.773
**  -1.001
***  -0.947
***    -0.053
***  -0.047
***  -0.041
***  -0.039
**  -0.048
***  -0.042
** 
  (-3.73)  (-3.48)  (-3.35)  (-2.48)  (-3.23)  (-2.69)    (-3.19)  (-3.02)  (-2.94)  (-2.50)  (-2.79)  (-2.36) 
Country q  2.540
***  2.573
***  2.744
***  2.633
***  2.556
**  2.278
***    0.087
**  0.089
**  0.097
**  0.105
**  0.102
**  0.078
* 
  (2.98)  (3.17)  (3.17)  (2.72)  (2.65)  (2.77)    (2.33)  (2.37)  (2.43)  (2.22)  (2.35)  (1.91) 
GDP growth  0.196
**  0.191
**  0.139
**  0.107
**  0.147
**  0.185
**    0.011
***  0.010
***  0.008
***  0.008
***  0.010
***  0.010
*** 
  (2.47)  (2.29)  (2.15)  (2.07)  (2.54)  (2.43)    (2.95)  (2.76)  (2.78)  (2.71)  (2.83)  (2.95) 
Market cap / GDP  0.857
*  0.34  -0.103  -0.228  0.705  0.752    0.088
***  0.057
**  0.042
*  0.048  0.083
**  0.084
*** 
  (1.68)  (0.66)  (-0.22)  (-0.46)  (1.30)  (1.47)    (3.00)  (2.16)  (1.76)  (1.67)  (2.66)  (2.90) 
Market turnover  0.976
*  0.988
*  0.961
*  0.381  0.554  0.951
*    0.027
*  0.028  0.027
*  0.005  0.011  0.026 
  (1.94)  (1.75)  (1.95)  (0.68)  (1.07)  (1.78)    (1.70)  (1.47)  (1.75)  (0.29)  (0.71)  (1.59) 
Log (GDP / capita)  -0.127  0.001  -0.049  0.211  0.093  -0.676    -0.018
*  -0.01  -0.014  -0.007  -0.011  -0.038
** 
  (-0.50)  (0.00)  (-0.21)  (1.01)  (0.41)  (-1.64)    (-1.91)  (-0.93)  (-1.56)  (-0.74)  (-1.26)  (-2.30) 
                           
Number of observations  890  890  890  777  777  890    890  890  890  777  777  890 
Adjusted R
2  0.1409  0.1616  0.2058  0.2250  0.1586  0.1497    0.1843  0.2228  0.2592  0.2339  0.1952  0.1902 
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Table 5. Financial globalization and domestic IPO activity. 
The dependent variable is each country’s annual measure of domestic IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 23,939 domestic IPOs from 54 
countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each country, domestic 
IPO counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows regressions where the dependent variable is domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged 
number of domestic firms. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is domestic IPO proceeds (winsorized at the top 5%) scaled by lagged 
GDP. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the domestic tranche of global IPOs. Both measures of domestic IPO activity are multiplied 
by 100. The count measure is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. Country-years with no data for the number of domestic firms or GDP are 
excluded. With the exception of the institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Variables are defined in Appendix B. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within 
countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Domestic IPO counts. 
 
Panel b. Domestic IPO proceeds. 
 
Common 
law 
(1) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(2) 
 
Disclosure 
(3) 
Liability 
standards 
(4) 
Rule of 
law 
(5) 
  Common 
law 
(6) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(7) 
 
Disclosure 
(8) 
Liability 
standards 
(9) 
Rule of 
law 
(10) 
                        Constant  -2.566  -3.965
*  -7.026
***  -4.099
**  3.246    -0.037  -0.084  -0.165
*  -0.064  0.211 
  (-1.04)  (-1.98)  (-3.04)  (-2.07)  (0.94)    (-0.36)  (-0.96)  (-1.68)  (-0.73)  (1.36) 
Institutions variable  1.521
*  5.277
***  6.676
***  2.578
*  0.907
*    0.091
***  0.251
***  0.232
***  0.081
*  0.035 
  (1.89)  (4.34)  (4.65)  (1.92)  (1.79)    (2.95)  (4.48)  (3.27)  (1.86)  (1.61) 
Institutions × World financial globalization  -1.828
**  -2.255
**  -4.037
***  -2.042
*  0.331    -0.100
***  -0.220
***  -0.193
***  -0.100
**  -0.002 
  (-2.38)  (-2.18)  (-3.02)  (-1.89)  (0.96)    (-3.21)  (-3.62)  (-2.80)  (-2.39)  (-0.13) 
World financial globalization  -1.164
***  -0.985
***  -0.799
***  -1.013
***  -0.949
***    -0.048
***  -0.041
***  -0.040
***  -0.048
***  -0.042
** 
  (-3.85)  (-3.57)  (-2.77)  (-3.37)  (-2.70)    (-3.45)  (-3.62)  (-2.80)  (-2.91)  (-2.36) 
Country q  2.516
***  2.695
***  2.501
**  2.519
**  2.210
***    0.086
**  0.092
**  0.099
**  0.100
**  0.078
* 
  (3.21)  (3.14)  (2.67)  (2.66)  (2.73)    (2.29)  (2.31)  (2.08)  (2.33)  (1.92) 
GDP growth  0.183
**  0.131
**  0.099
*  0.145
**  0.192
**    0.010
**  0.007
**  0.008
**  0.009
***  0.010
*** 
  (2.16)  (2.01)  (1.93)  (2.48)  (2.42)    (2.66)  (2.48)  (2.59)  (2.80)  (2.91) 
Market cap / GDP  0.373  -0.077  -0.121  0.737  0.716    0.059
**  0.045
*  0.054
*  0.084
***  0.084
*** 
  (0.73)  (-0.17)  (-0.24)  (1.36)  (1.38)    (2.26)  (1.96)  (1.81)  (2.70)  (2.85) 
Market turnover  1.057
*  0.966
*  0.419  0.577  0.931
*    0.032
*  0.027
*  0.007  0.012  0.027 
  (1.96)  (1.96)  (0.77)  (1.14)  (1.76)    (1.81)  (1.77)  (0.42)  (0.80)  (1.60) 
Log (GDP / capita)  -0.002  -0.049  0.192  0.094  -0.652    -0.010  -0.014  -0.008  -0.011  -0.038
** 
  (-0.01)  (-0.22)  (0.92)  (0.42)  (-1.59)    (-0.96)  (-1.62)  (-0.85)  (-1.26)  (-2.32) 
                        Number of observations  890  890  777  777  890    890  890  777  777  890 
Adjusted R
2  0.1753  0.2110  0.2418  0.1642  0.1507    0.2440  0.2879  0.2508  0.2013  0.1893 
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Table 6. Determinants of the relative importance of global IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
The dependent variable is each country’s annual measure of relative global IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 23,939 domestic IPOs and 
5,091 global IPOs from 54 countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For 
each country, for both domestic and global IPOs, counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows regressions where the dependent variable is 
global minus domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is global 
minus domestic IPO proceeds (winsorized at the top 5%) scaled by lagged GDP. Proceeds from the domestic tranche of a global IPO are excluded. Both 
measures of relative global IPO activity are multiplied by 100. The count measure is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. With the exception of the 
institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Variables are defined in Appendix B. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for 
clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Global – domestic IPO counts. 
 
Panel b. Global – domestic IPO proceeds. 
 
 
 
(1) 
Common 
law 
(2) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(3) 
 
Disclosure 
(4) 
Liability 
standards 
(5) 
Rule of 
law 
(6) 
   
 
(7) 
Common 
law 
(8) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(9) 
 
Disclosure 
(10) 
Liability 
standards 
(11) 
Rule of 
law 
(12) 
                           
Constant  -8.519
***  -6.656
*  -4.839  -2.387  -6.509
*  -11.685
***    -0.675
***  -0.582
***  -0.512
***  -0.421
**  -0.581
***  -0.703
*** 
  (-2.81)  (-1.98)  (-1.45)  (-0.62)  (-1.79)  (-3.55)    (-4.36)  (-3.64)  (-3.42)  (-2.65)  (-3.43)  (-4.04) 
Institutions variable    -1.872
**  -5.166
***  -7.376
***  -3.436
**  -0.937
*      -0.093
**  -0.228
***  -0.246
**  -0.070  -0.008 
    (-2.01)  (-4.00)  (-4.19)  (-2.18)  (-1.76)      (-2.19)  (-3.23)  (-2.51)  (-0.81)  (-0.42) 
World financial globalization  1.364
***  1.247
***  1.117
***  0.938
***  1.146
***  1.076
***    0.055
**  0.049
**  0.044
**  0.041
*  0.051
**  0.053
** 
  (4.20)  (3.77)  (3.53)  (2.80)  (3.67)  (3.27)    (2.39)  (2.21)  (2.07)  (1.85)  (2.21)  (2.30) 
Country q  -1.466  -1.504  -1.642
*  -1.921
*  -1.861
*  -1.167    -0.053  -0.055  -0.061  -0.103  -0.101  -0.051 
  (-1.55)  (-1.64)  (-1.68)  (-1.74)  (-1.78)  (-1.25)    (-0.90)  (-0.91)  (-0.96)  (-1.52)  (-1.56)  (-0.82) 
World q  3.366
*  3.342
*  2.900  3.957
*  4.341
**  2.589    0.471
***  0.470
***  0.450
***  0.506
***  0.519
***  0.464
*** 
  (1.82)  (1.80)  (1.50)  (1.82)  (2.20)  (1.27)    (3.14)  (3.13)  (2.98)  (2.99)  (3.10)  (3.00) 
GDP growth  -0.141
**  -0.136
**  -0.084  -0.077  -0.121
*  -0.128
**    -0.003  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003  -0.003 
  (-2.25)  (-2.04)  (-1.58)  (-1.21)  (-1.77)  (-2.08)    (-0.78)  (-0.72)  (-0.23)  (-0.33)  (-0.62)  (-0.75) 
Market cap / GDP  -1.180
**  -0.550  -0.244  0.108  -0.788  -1.080
**    0.076  0.107  0.117
*  0.120  0.083  0.077 
  (-2.15)  (-0.87)  (-0.45)  (0.18)  (-1.36)  (-2.04)    (1.13)  (1.50)  (1.68)  (1.52)  (1.10)  (1.15) 
Market turnover  -1.164
**  -1.178
*  -1.154
**  -0.617  -0.775  -1.147
*    -0.075
***  -0.076
***  -0.074
***  -0.051
**  -0.058
***  -0.075
*** 
  (-2.14)  (-1.88)  (-2.14)  (-0.99)  (-1.34)  (-1.97)    (-3.78)  (-3.26)  (-3.99)  (-2.56)  (-2.99)  (-3.73) 
Log (GDP / capita)  0.454
*  0.299  0.381  0.197  0.318  1.006
**    0.012  0.004  0.008  -0.001  0.004  0.017 
  (1.80)  (1.02)  (1.57)  (0.81)  (1.25)  (2.47)    (0.75)  (0.23)  (0.57)  (-0.04)  (0.24)  (0.78) 
                           
Number of observations  890  890  890  777  777  890    890  890  890  777  777  890 
Adjusted R
2  0.1251  0.1560  0.1864  0.2073  0.1524  0.1337    0.0932  0.1104  0.1205  0.1141  0.0931  0.0923 
                           47 
Table 7. Financial globalization and the relative importance of global IPO activity. 
The dependent variable is each country’s annual measure of relative global IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 23,939 domestic IPOs and 
5,091 global IPOs from 54 countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For 
each country, for both domestic and global IPOs, counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows regressions where the dependent variable is 
global minus domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is global 
minus domestic IPO proceeds (winsorized at the top 5%) scaled by lagged GDP. Proceeds from the domestic tranche of a global IPO are excluded. Both 
measures of relative global IPO activity are multiplied by 100. The count measure is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. With the exception of the 
institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Variables are defined in Appendix B. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for 
clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Global – domestic IPO counts. 
 
Panel b. Global – domestic IPO proceeds. 
 
Common 
law 
(1) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(2) 
 
Disclosure 
(3) 
Liability 
standards 
(4) 
Rule of 
law 
(5) 
  Common 
law 
(6) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(7) 
 
Disclosure 
(8) 
Liability 
standards 
(9) 
Rule of 
law 
(10) 
                        Constant  -4.153  -2.521  -0.651  -4.255  -9.584
***    -0.480
***  -0.409
***  -0.347
**  -0.482
***  -0.602
*** 
  (-1.31)  (-0.80)  (-0.18)  (-1.22)  (-2.91)    (-3.30)  (-2.95)  (-2.35)  (-3.19)  (-3.74) 
Institutions variable  -1.848
**  -5.151
***  -7.099
***  -3.374
**  -0.927
*    -0.091
**  -0.227
***  -0.227
**  -0.067  -0.009 
  (-2.05)  (-4.05)  (-4.10)  (-2.18)  (-1.75)    (-2.30)  (-3.37)  (-2.54)  (-0.80)  (-0.43) 
Institutions × World financial globalization  2.374
***  3.127
**  4.037
***  1.482  -0.099    0.165
**  0.354
**  0.278
*  0.059  0.001 
  (3.00)  (2.61)  (2.99)  (1.30)  (-0.31)    (2.52)  (2.63)  (1.90)  (0.69)  (0.05) 
World financial globalization  1.274
***  1.119
***  0.967
***  1.155
***  1.077
***    0.051
**  0.045
**  0.043
**  0.051
**  0.053
** 
  (4.32)  (3.87)  (3.06)  (3.77)  (3.28)    (2.54)  (2.50)  (2.02)  (2.23)  (2.30) 
Country q  -1.423  -1.563  -1.773  -1.831
*  -1.147    -0.050  -0.052  -0.093  -0.100  -0.051 
  (-1.62)  (-1.61)  (-1.65)  (-1.77)  (-1.23)    (-0.85)  (-0.85)  (-1.40)  (-1.55)  (-0.82) 
World q  3.192
*  2.670  3.636  4.281
**  2.592    0.459
***  0.424
***  0.484
***  0.517
***  0.464
*** 
  (1.74)  (1.38)  (1.67)  (2.16)  (1.28)    (3.12)  (2.89)  (2.93)  (3.10)  (3.00) 
GDP growth  -0.124
*  -0.071  -0.068  -0.119
*  -0.130
**    -0.002  0.001  -0.001  -0.003  -0.003 
  (-1.88)  (-1.32)  (-1.09)  (-1.73)  (-2.05)    (-0.58)  (0.21)  (-0.20)  (-0.61)  (-0.77) 
Market cap / GDP  -0.594  -0.282  -0.001  -0.811  -1.069
*    0.104  0.113
*  0.112  0.082  0.077 
  (-0.98)  (-0.54)  (-0.00)  (-1.41)  (-2.00)    (1.56)  (1.78)  (1.49)  (1.09)  (1.16) 
Market turnover  -1.270
**  -1.163
**  -0.659  -0.793  -1.141
*    -0.082
***  -0.075
***  -0.054
***  -0.058
***  -0.075
*** 
  (-2.12)  (-2.15)  (-1.08)  (-1.39)  (-1.95)    (-3.83)  (-4.00)  (-2.80)  (-3.07)  (-3.69) 
Log (GDP / capita)  0.303  0.383  0.218  0.317  0.999
**    0.004  0.009  0.001  0.004  0.017 
  (1.06)  (1.60)  (0.89)  (1.24)  (2.45)    (0.26)  (0.63)  (0.06)  (0.23)  (0.80) 
                        Number of observations  890  890  777  777  890    890  890  777  777  890 
Adjusted R
2  0.1796  0.1972  0.2221  0.1545  0.1329    0.1371  0.1544  0.1314  0.0931  0.0913 
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Table 8. Financial globalization and the rise of non-U.S. IPOs. 
The dependent variable is each country’s annual measure of total IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 29,030 domestic and global IPOs from 
54 countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each country, total IPO 
counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows regressions where the dependent variable is total IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of 
domestic firms. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is total IPO proceeds (winsorized at the top 5%) scaled by lagged GDP. Both 
measures of IPO activity are multiplied by 100. The count measure is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. Country-years with no data for the number 
of domestic firms or GDP are excluded. With the exception of the institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Variables are defined in 
Appendix B. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are independent across 
countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Total IPO counts.    Panel b. Total IPO proceeds. 
 
Common 
law 
(1) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(2) 
 
Disclosure 
(3) 
Liability 
standards 
(4) 
Rule of 
law 
(5) 
 
Common 
law 
(6) 
Anti-self-
dealing 
(7) 
 
Disclosure 
(8) 
Liability 
standards 
(9) 
Rule of 
law 
(10) 
                        Constant  -6.203
**  -7.729
***  -12.135
***  -8.146
***  -0.356    -0.099  -0.148  -0.241  -0.102  0.278 
  (-2.08)  (-3.41)  (-4.66)  (-3.75)  (-0.08)    (-0.60)  (-0.93)  (-1.49)  (-0.66)  (1.18) 
Institutions variable  1.392  5.378
***  7.341
***  2.266  0.907    0.109
**  0.290
***  0.300
**  0.140
*  0.055 
  (1.50)  (3.62)  (4.97)  (1.53)  (1.49)    (2.09)  (2.77)  (2.41)  (1.71)  (1.45) 
World financial globalization  -1.025
**  -0.849
**  -0.578  -0.831
**  -0.818
*    -0.043
**  -0.035
**  -0.031  -0.039
*  -0.032 
  (-2.58)  (-2.39)  (-1.52)  (-2.19)  (-1.89)    (-2.25)  (-2.02)  (-1.57)  (-1.81)  (-1.37) 
Non-U.S. dummy  1.805
*  1.465
**  3.376
***  2.048
**  0.718    0.212
***  0.169
***  0.235
***  0.202
***  0.128
*** 
  (1.93)  (2.60)  (4.30)  (2.10)  (1.22)    (3.64)  (3.98)  (3.97)  (3.45)  (2.87) 
Non-U.S. × World financial globalization  2.358
***  2.293
***  2.240
***  2.490
***  2.353
***    0.137
***  0.135
***  0.129
***  0.138
***  0.138
*** 
  (4.98)  (4.87)  (4.96)  (5.43)  (4.88)    (5.45)  (5.28)  (4.76)  (5.43)  (5.35) 
Country q  3.914
***  4.077
***  3.807
***  3.661
***  3.587
***    0.168
***  0.175
***  0.160
**  0.155
**  0.147
** 
  (4.16)  (4.08)  (3.70)  (3.45)  (3.78)    (2.82)  (2.90)  (2.20)  (2.20)  (2.31) 
GDP growth  0.244
**  0.191
**  0.140
**  0.186
***  0.240
**    0.020
***  0.017
***  0.016
***  0.018
***  0.020
*** 
  (2.18)  (2.14)  (2.47)  (2.94)  (2.31)    (3.50)  (3.52)  (3.61)  (3.82)  (3.81) 
Market cap / GDP  0.092  -0.421  -0.464  0.582  0.444    0.218
***  0.201
***  0.210
**  0.246
***  0.247
*** 
  (0.15)  (-0.71)  (-0.81)  (0.94)  (0.69)    (2.95)  (2.80)  (2.44)  (2.93)  (3.11) 
Market turnover  0.814  0.782  0.133  0.312  0.758    -0.017  -0.019  -0.044
**  -0.037
*  -0.021 
  (1.50)  (1.61)  (0.27)  (0.67)  (1.45)    (-0.71)  (-0.88)  (-2.07)  (-1.74)  (-0.93) 
Log (GDP / capita)  0.359  0.319  0.685
***  0.541
**  -0.300    -0.010  -0.015  -0.006  -0.012  -0.052
* 
  (1.01)  (1.16)  (2.83)  (2.08)  (-0.57)    (-0.53)  (-0.88)  (-0.40)  (-0.78)  (-1.93) 
                       
Number of observations  890  890  777  777  890    890  890  777  777  890 
Adjusted R
2  0.1482  0.1848  0.2169  0.1581  0.1426    0.2388  0.2510  0.2644  0.2533  0.2296 
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Table 9. Robustness tests. 
The dependent variable is each country’s annual measure of IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 23,939 domestic IPOs and 5,091 global 
IPOs from 54 countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each 
country, IPO counts and proceeds are summed annually. With the exception of model (1) which uses total IPO counts, Panel a shows regressions where 
the dependent variable is domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is 
domestic IPO proceeds (winsorized at the top 5%) scaled by lagged GDP. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the domestic tranche of 
global IPOs. Both measures of domestic IPO activity are multiplied by 100. The count measure is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. Panels c and d 
show regressions that use relative global IPO (global – domestic) counts and proceeds. Country-years with no data for the number of domestic firms or 
GDP are excluded. With the exception of the institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Variables are defined in Appendix B. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not 
within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Domestic IPO counts. 
 
Panel b. Domestic IPO proceeds. 
 
 
Max of SDC/ 
Ritter samples 
(1) 
KOF 
globalization 
Measure 
(2) 
 
 
2SLS 
(3) 
 
 
Tobit 
(4) 
   
Uncapped 
proceeds 
(5) 
KOF 
globalization 
Measure 
(6) 
 
 
2SLS 
(7) 
 
 
Tobit 
(8) 
                   
Constant  -6.578
**  8.898
*  -1.694  -11.519
***    -0.172  0.496
**  -0.026  -0.418
*** 
  (-2.25)  (1.96)  (-0.59)  (-3.01)    (-1.44)  (2.40)  (-0.22)  (-2.61) 
Anti-self-dealing  5.967
***  5.195
***  4.566
**  8.846
***    0.318
***  0.246
***  0.274
***  0.409
*** 
  (3.43)  (4.27)  (2.00)  (4.51)    (4.68)  (4.30)  (3.16)  (4.77) 
World financial globalization  -1.455
***  -0.202
***  -1.020
***  -0.907
**    -0.027  -0.009
***  -0.040
***  -0.036
** 
  (-3.40)  (-3.53)  (-3.14)  (-2.38)    (-1.42)  (-3.38)  (-2.72)  (-2.15) 
Country q  5.912
***  2.591
***  2.716
***  4.595
***    0.158
***  0.090
**  0.098
**  0.178
*** 
  (5.35)  (3.03)  (3.19)  (3.93)    (3.03)  (2.23)  (2.45)  (3.67) 
GDP growth  0.203
*  0.135
**  0.147
*  0.205
**    0.009
***  0.008
***  0.008
**  0.011
*** 
  (1.93)  (2.12)  (1.90)  (2.07)    (2.72)  (2.79)  (2.50)  (2.72) 
Market cap / GDP  -0.979  -0.013  0.028  -0.224    0.033  0.047
*  0.038  0.041 
  (-1.33)  (-0.03)  (0.05)  (-0.32)    (1.17)  (1.93)  (1.50)  (1.32) 
Market turnover  0.735  1.019
**  0.963
**  1.609
***    0.045  0.030
**  0.027
*  0.054
** 
  (1.43)  (2.11)  (1.97)  (2.79)    (1.53)  (2.02)  (1.76)  (2.48) 
Log (GDP / capita)  0.357  -0.073  -0.059  0.258    -0.008  -0.015  -0.014  -0.002 
  (1.12)  (-0.32)  (-0.25)  (0.68)    (-0.71)  (-1.67)  (-1.45)  (-0.15) 
                   
Number of observations  890  890  890  890    890  890  890  890 
Adjusted R
2 (Pseudo-R
2 for Tobit)  0.2092  0.2115  0.2045  0.0589    0.1936  0.2686  0.2586  0.4706 
                   50 
Table 9, continued. 
  Panel c. Global – domestic IPO counts. 
 
Panel d. Global – domestic IPO proceeds. 
 
KOF 
globalization 
Measure 
(9) 
 
 
2SLS 
(10) 
   
Uncapped  
proceeds 
(11) 
KOF 
globalization 
Measure 
(12) 
 
 
2SLS 
(13) 
             
Constant  -17.663
***  -4.562    -0.565
**  -0.980
***  -0.478
*** 
  (-3.17)  (-1.13)    (-2.26)  (-3.15)  (-2.72) 
Anti-self-dealing  -5.067
***  -5.555
**    -0.280
***  -0.226
***  -0.276
** 
  (-3.94)  (-2.08)    (-2.90)  (-3.19)  (-2.20) 
World financial globalization  0.223
***  1.098
***    0.046  0.008
**  0.042
* 
  (3.77)  (3.25)    (1.54)  (2.10)  (1.91) 
Country q  -1.505  -1.655
*    -0.119  -0.056  -0.063 
  (-1.55)  (-1.69)    (-1.24)  (-0.88)  (-0.97) 
World q  3.522
*  2.865    0.504
**  0.475
***  0.446
*** 
  (1.81)  (1.47)    (2.12)  (3.10)  (3.01) 
GDP growth  -0.081  -0.080    -0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
  (-1.56)  (-1.45)    (-0.04)  (-0.20)  (-0.08) 
Market cap / GDP  -0.333  -0.174    0.159  0.115  0.126
* 
  (-0.60)  (-0.24)    (1.63)  (1.61)  (1.67) 
Market turnover  -1.209
**  -1.153
**    -0.110
***  -0.076
***  -0.074
*** 
  (-2.29)  (-2.16)    (-3.30)  (-4.13)  (-4.05) 
Log (GDP / capita)  0.404  0.375    0.016  0.009  0.008 
  (1.65)  (1.49)    (0.85)  (0.62)  (0.51) 
             
Number of observations  890  890    890  890  890 
Adjusted R
2  0.1921  0.1861    0.0890  0.1211  0.1192 
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Figure 1. Total IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
This figure shows annual IPO activity for all countries (World), the U.S., U.K., and China from 1990 to 2007. 
IPO data is from SDC and includes 29,341 domestic and global IPOs from 89 countries over the period from 
1990 to 2007. Panel a shows the total number of IPOs (domestic and global) each year. Panel b shows total 
IPO proceeds raised (domestic and global) each year. Proceeds are in constant 2007 U.S. dollars (millions). 
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Figure 2. U.S. and world IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
This figure shows annual IPO activity for the U.S. and all other countries (World) from 1990 to 2007. IPO data 
is from SDC and includes 29,341 domestic and global IPOs from 89 countries. Panel a shows the total number 
of IPOs (domestic and global) scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms each year. Panel b shows total 
IPO proceeds raised (domestic and global) scaled lagged GDP each year. Proceeds and GDP are in constant 
2007 U.S. dollars (millions). 
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Figure 3. The U.S. share of world IPO activity. 
This figure shows annual share of IPO activity for U.S. firms relative to firms in the rest of the world from 
1990 to 2007. IPO data is from SDC and includes 24,155 domestic IPOs and 5,186 global IPOs from 89 
countries. Panel a shows the number of U.S. IPOs scaled by the number of IPOs by firms from the rest of the 
world. Panel b shows IPO proceeds raised by U.S. firms scaled by IPO proceeds raised by firms from the rest 
of the world. Proceeds and GDP are in constant 2007 U.S. dollars (millions). 
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Appendix A. Summary statistics and correlations for country-level variables. 
This table shows the average values of the country variables. The sample is restricted to 54 countries that have data available for GDP and for country q 
for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. Each variable is averaged across years within a given country and is then averaged 
across countries. Correlations are limited to those countries with data for each institutions variable. 
Variable  N  Mean  Median  Std dev  Min  Max  25
th 
pctile 
75
th 
pctile 
                  
Domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged # of domestic firms  54  2.570  1.317  2.882  0.019  11.959  0.366  3.929 
Domestic IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP  54  0.100  0.043  0.118  0.000  0.495  0.017  0.141 
Global IPO – domestic IPO counts by the lagged # of domestic firms  54  -1.150  -0.195  3.396  -10.059  11.354  -2.891  0.504 
Global IPO – domestic IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP  54  0.395  0.050  2.588  -0.283  19.040  -0.010  0.104 
Total IPO counts scaled by the lagged # of domestic firms  54  4.158  3.307  3.983  0.067  20.900  1.543  6.433 
Total IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP  54  0.602  0.198  2.604  0.0126  19.321  0.099  0.342 
Common law  53  0.302  0.000  0.463  0.000  1.000  0.000  1.000 
Anti-self-dealing  53  0.484  0.440  0.240  0.092  1.000  0.288  0.642 
Disclosure  45  0.624  0.580  0.209  0.170  1.000  0.500  0.750 
Liability of standards  45  0.487  0.440  0.252  0.000  1.000  0.220  0.660 
Rule of law  54  0.763  0.856  0.925  -1.040  1.986  -0.010  1.643 
World financial globalization  54  1.893  1.893  0.000  1.893  1.893  1.893  1.893 
Country q  54  1.277  1.294  0.182  0.903  1.819  1.177  1.362 
World q  54  1.258  1.258  0.000  1.258  1.258  1.258  1.258 
GDP growth  54  3.456  2.974  1.828  -0.218  9.550  2.362  4.458 
Market cap / GDP  54  0.594  0.429  0.515  0.072  2.587  0.220  0.815 
Market turnover  54  0.588  0.482  0.494  0.016  2.745  0.234  0.722 
Log (GDP / capita)  54  8.884  9.284  1.377  6.082  10.782  7.967  10.134 
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Appendix A, continued. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
                                     
Dom IPO counts / lagged # of dom firms (1)  1.00                                   
Dom IPO proceeds / lagged GDP (2)  0.80  1.00                                 
Global – dom IPO counts / total # if IPOs (3)  -0.92  -0.79  1.00                               
Global – dom IPO proceeds / total IPO proceeds (4)  -0.47  -0.39  0.61  1.00                             
Total IPO counts / lagged # of dom firms (5)  0.91  0.68  -0.69  -0.24  1.00                           
Total IPO proceeds / lagged GDP (6)  0.60  0.86  -0.50  0.14  0.59  1.00                         
Common law (7)  0.38  0.53  -0.37  -0.18  0.33  0.47  1.00                       
Anti-self-dealing (8)  0.51  0.61  -0.43  -0.11  0.50  0.60  0.72  1.00                     
Disclosure (9)  0.62  0.63  -0.57  -0.18  0.57  0.58  0.64  0.64  1.00                   
Liability standards (10)  0.38  0.35  -0.39  -0.03  0.32  0.37  0.34  0.37  0.49  1.00                 
Rule of law (11)  0.24  0.13  -0.06  0.11  0.39  0.21  0.04  0.27  0.26  0.23  1.00               
World financial globalization (12)  .  .  .  .      .  .  .  .  .  .             
Country q (13)  0.09  -0.02  -0.12  -0.16  0.04  -0.12  0.13  0.03  0.20  0.10  0.07  .  1.00           
World q (14)  .  .  .  .      .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .         
GDP growth (16)  0.42  0.58  -0.39  -0.23  0.38  0.49  0.30  0.41  0.42  0.12  -0.11  .  0.14  .  1.00       
Market cap / GDP (16)  0.37  0.54  -0.31  0.14  0.36  0.67  0.36  0.52  0.59  0.40  0.41  .  0.00  .  0.12  1.00     
Market turnover (17)  0.43  0.22  -0.40  -0.39  0.39  0.02  -0.05  0.01  0.21  0.16  0.18  .  0.22  .  0.24  0.05  1.00   
Log (GDP / capita) (18)  0.13  -0.01  0.06  0.17  0.30  0.09  -0.14  0.15  0.06  0.13  0.87  .  -0.11  .  -0.31  0.37  0.17  1.00 
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Appendix B. Variable definitions. 
IPO data is from SDC’s Global New Issues Database. IPO proceeds are in constant 2007 U.S. dollars. Country-level variables are from the World Bank’s 
WDI Database, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators database, and the 2008 update of the Financial Development and Structure database, originally used in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2000). Data to compute Tobin’s q is from Worldscope. 
Variable  Definition 
   
Domestic IPO counts / lagged # of domestic firms  Number of domestic IPOs in country j in year t divided by number of domestic listed firms in country j in year t-1 and is 
multiplied by 100. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
 
Domestic IPO proceeds / lagged GDP  Proceeds raised in domestic IPOs in country j in year t divided by GDP for country j in year t-1 and is multiplied by 100. 
Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the domestic tranche of global IPOs. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
 
Global – domestic IPO counts / total number of 
IPOs 
(Number of global – domestic IPOs in country j in year t) divided by number of domestic listed firms in country j in year t-1 
and is multiplied by 100. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
 
Global – domestic IPO proceeds / total IPO 
proceeds 
(Global – domestic IPO proceeds raised in country j in year t) divided by GDP for country j in year t-1 and is multiplied by 
100. Proceeds include proceeds raised in the international tranches only. Proceeds from the domestic tranche of a global IPO 
are excluded. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
 
Total IPO counts / lagged # of domestic firms  Total number of IPOs (domestic and global) in country j in year t divided by number of domestic listed firms in country j in 
year t-1 and is multiplied by 100. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
 
Total IPO proceeds / lagged GDP  Total proceeds raised in IPOs (domestic and global) in country j in year t divided by GDP for country j in year t-1 and is 
multiplied by 100. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
 
Common law  Equals one if a country’s origin of commercial law is English common law, and zero otherwise. Source: DLLS (2008). 
 
Anti-self-dealing  Average of ex ante and ex post private control of self-dealing, where ex ante is the average of approval by disinterested 
shareholders and ex ante disclosure; ex post is the average of disclosure in periodic filings and ease of proving wrongdoing. 
Ranges from zero to one. Source: DLLS (2008). 
 
Disclosure  Arithmetic mean of (1) prospectus; (2) compensation; (3) shareholders; (4) inside ownership; (5) contracts irregular; and (6) 
transactions. Ranges from zero to one.  Source: LLS (2006). 
 
Liability standards  Arithmetic mean of (1) liability standard for the issuer and its directors; (2) liability standard for distributors; and (3) liability 
standard for accountants. Ranges from zero to one. Source: LLS (2006). 
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Appendix B, continued. 
Variable  Definition 
Rule of law  Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Ranges from -1.6753 to 2.0431. Source: 2009 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators database. 
 
World financial globalization  Each year, the U.S. dollar-denominated value of external assets and liabilities is summed across countries and divided by 
world GDP (in U.S. dollars). Source: updated and extended dataset compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
 
Country q  For each firm in country j q is computed annually as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity 
all divided by book value of total assets (all variables in local currency). For each country, median industry qs are computed 
annually using the Fama-French 17 industry classification scheme. The industry qs are then weighted by their relative market 
values each year so that country q is the market value weighted average of the median industry qs. Source: Worldscope. 
 
World q  For each firm in country j q is computed annually as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity 
all divided by book value of total assets (all variables in local currency). World median industry qs are computed across all 
firms worldwide using the Fama-French 17 industry classification scheme. To compute world q, each world industry q is 
weighted by the industry’s relative market value (in USD). Source: Worldscope. 
 
GDP growth  Annual GDP growth. Source: WDI database. 
 
Market cap / GDP  Value of listed shares to GDP. Source: Financial Development and Structure database. 
 
Market turnover 
Ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization. Source: Financial Development and Structure 
database. 
 
Log (GDP / capita)  Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is in current U.S. dollars. Source: WDI database. 
 
Non-U.S. dummy  Equals zero for the United States and one for all other countries. 
   
 
 